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THE LIGHTS ARE ON: SHINING A SPOTLIGHT ON THE
RETAIL ENERGY MARKET REVEALS THE NEED FOR
ENHANCED CONSUMER PROTECTIONS
Carrie Scrufari*
“All life is an experiment”
~ Ralph Waldo Emerson
“If we did all the things we are capable of, we would
literally astound ourselves.”
~ Thomas Edison1
ABSTRACT
In the 1990s, New York embarked on an experiment of epic
proportions when it sought to restructure what had become a regulated
monopoly of an industry: its energy sector. Like many other states,
New York sought to increase competition within the energy sector to
drive down prices for consumers and expand the range of renewable
energy options that were available. After waiting nearly three decades,
New York appears poised to finally assess the efficacy of this great
experiment. Years of escalating consumer complaints, Attorney
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General investigations, and analysis by the Department of Public
Service Staff have revealed that residential consumers are not faring
as well as the State had hoped. Since 2014, New Yorkers electing to
receive energy commodity service from companies competing with the
default utilities were overcharged to the tune of one billion dollars. In
households where families struggle to make ends meet and often must
choose between putting dinner on the table or keeping the heat on, any
overcharge on an energy bill creates a public health hazard. Having
faced its third polar vortex in five years, more New York families than
ever before confront the Hobson’s choice of paying for food or paying
for energy at a time when costs have never been higher. This article
argues for the necessity of implementing additional consumer
protection measures in the retail access energy market.
INTRODUCTION
What are society’s most important needs? What is essential to ensure
survival? Physiologically, humans require clean air, water, and food,
but meeting these basic needs often requires another resource. Upon
waking, before most people take a sip of water or a bite of breakfast,
they do something else just as vital to their survival. If they are lucky,
most people take one action before any other – turning on a light
switch. Before consuming food or drink, people consume another vital
resource equally necessary to health and wellbeing: energy. Indeed,
energy is often a prerequisite to fulfilling other basic needs. Drinking
water and eating breakfast usually require turning on a tap, opening a
refrigerator, or lighting a stove. In modern society, most people rely
on energy to access the jobs that allow them to pay for food and drink,
whether it be by car, bus, or train. Even those who walk or bike to their
place of employment rely on energy the moment they turn on an office
light, fire up a computer, or make a phone call – all tasks likely
necessary to earning the paychecks that allow for continued survival.
Energy becomes even more immediate to survival for humans
inhabiting parts of the globe prone to extreme heat or cold. Thus, air,
food, water, and energy are all crucial to humans’ continued survival
as a species and as a society.
The Herculean task before governments around the world is
determining how to meet these basic needs without destroying the
global ecosystem. Habitat is just as crucial for survival, as it supports

2018]

THE LIGHTS ARE ON

351

continued access to clean air, food, and water. With climate change
threatening many populations’ ability to continue meeting their basic
needs, lives across the globe depend on crafting solutions that can be
implemented immediately.
Civil society recognized climate change as a threat to global
existence at the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties
(COP) in Paris in 2015 by committing “to strengthen the global
response to the threat of climate change by keeping a global
temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase
even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius.”2 The Paris Agreement entered
into force on November 4, 2016.3 To date, 175 of the 197 Parties to the
Convention have ratified the Agreement.4
Despite global consensus on the need to mitigate the effects of, and
adapt to, climate change,5 President Donald Trump announced on June
1, 2017, “[i]n order to fulfill my solemn duty to protect America and
its citizens, the United States will withdraw from the Paris Climate
Accord.”6 The response of other elected officials, similarly charged
with safeguarding the health and welfare of American citizens, was
immediate. New York Governor Andrew M. Cuomo announced the
state’s commitment to adhere to the standards contained in the Paris
Accord “regardless of Washington’s irresponsible actions,” and signed
an Executive Order “confirming New York’s leadership role in
2. Conference of Parties’ Twenty-first Session, U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12,
2015) [hereinafter Paris Agreement]. http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/
convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf; see also id. at art. 2(1)(a).
3. Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification, UNFCCC, (last visited Apr. 13,
2018).
4. Paris Agreement, supra note 2. See also Progress Tracker, Work Programme
Resulting from the Relevant Requests Contained in Decision 1/CP.21, United
Nations Climate Change Secretariat, June 20, 2017, http://unfccc.int/files/
paris_agreement/application/pdf/pa_progress_tracker_200617.pdf.
5. See generally Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC). Climate
Change 2007: Synthesis Report; Summary for Policymakers, IPCC, 2007,
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_
assessment_report_synthesis_report.htm.
6. White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by President Trump on
the Paris Climate Accord, Rose Garden (June 1, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2017/06/01/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord.
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protecting our citizens, our environment, and our planet.”7 Cuomo, in
concert with California Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. and
Washington State Governor Jay R. Inslee, formed the United States
Climate Alliance – a coalition of states acting to uphold the
commitments of the Paris Agreement.8 Cuomo’s rationale for
upholding the Paris Agreement was simple and premised on basic
survival. Quoting projected estimates of rising sea levels of one to four
feet by the year 2100, Cuomo declared, “New York State would be
devastated. . . . Even at a fraction of that rise, Manhattan as we know
it would be gone, not to mention millions of people along the East
Coast would be [d]isplaced, with hundreds of billions of dollars of real
estate value disappeared.”9
The public health consequences associated with failing to shift from
fossil fuels to cleaner renewable energy sources are even more
immediate than those associated with taking no action to mitigate the
effects of climate change. Communities need not wait until 2100 to
feel the disastrous effects of carbon emissions or to feel the benefits of
reducing those emissions by moving away from fossil fuels. Experts
attribute 6.5 million deaths annually to air pollution alone, noting that
“[e]nergy production and use is the most important source of air
pollution coming from human activity.”10
7. N.Y. Governor Andrew Cuomo Press Office, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo
Signs Executive Order and Commits New York to Uphold the Standards Set Forth
in the Paris Accord (June 1, 2017), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governorandrew-m-cuomo-signs-executive-order-and-commits-new-york-uphold-standardsset-forth. See also Executive Order No. 166, II (articulating New York’s policy to
create a 40% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 and an 80% reduction
by 2050), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/
USClimateAllianceExecutiveOrder.pdf.
8. See N.Y. Governor Andrew Cuomo Press Office, New York Governor
Cuomo, California Governor Brown, and Washington Governor Inslee Announce
Formation of United States Climate Alliance; Cuomo, Brown and Inslee Will Serve
as Co-Chairs, Urge Other States to Join Alliance (June 1, 2017),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/new-york-governor-cuomo-californiagovernor-brown-and-washington-governor-inslee-announce.
9. Andrew Ratzkin, You Say You Want A Rev Solution: Considering New York’s
Marquee Energy Initiative As Climate Change Policy, 41 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 471,
473 (2016) (quoting Governor Andrew Cuomo’s speech, Oct. 8, 2015).
10. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY AND AIR POLLUTION, 3 (2016),
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WorldEnergyOutloo
kSpecialReport2016EnergyandAirPollution.pdf.
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Coal combustion remains the world’s largest source of electricity
generation.11 Relying on coal for power means releasing particulate
matter (linked to respiratory problems such as asthma and lung
cancer),12 sulfur dioxide (correlated with increased risk of death due to
respiratory and cardiovascular complications),13 and nitrogen dioxide
(associated with increased susceptibility to bacterial and viral
infections, brachial inflammation, and decreased pulmonary
function).14 Air pollution associated with coal combustion poses more
than just respiratory problems. Because coal contains naturally
occurring heavy metals such as mercury, these metals are released into
the atmosphere as gas when coal is burned; coal combustion at power
plants produces 26% of global mercury emissions.15 This mercury is
deposited into waterways where it is converted to methylmercury,
contaminating fish at all stages of the food chain and ultimately the
humans who consume that fish.16 When pregnant women consume
contaminated fish, the mercury emissions “locally, regionally, and
internationally . . . can cause developmental effects in their offspring
such as lower intelligence levels, delayed neurodevelopment, and
subtle changes in vision, memory, and language.”17
A common argument against transitioning away from coal
generation to renewables, such as solar, is that renewables like solar
are too expensive and cost consumers too much.18 However, if the true
11. Erica Burt, et al., Scientific Evidence of Health Effects from Coal Use in
Energy Consumption, U. ILL. CHI. SCH. PUB. HEALTH, HEALTHCARE RESEARCH
COLLABORATIVE 4 (2013), https://noharm-uscanada.org/sites/default/files/
documents-files/828/Health_Effects_Coal_Use_Energy_Generation.pdf
(noting
that “forty percent of world electricity comes from coal combustion.”).
12. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Integrated Science Assessment for Particulate
Matter, EPA/600/R-08/139F (2009).
13. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Integrated Science Assessment for Sulfur Oxides Health Criteria, EPA/600/R-08/047F (Sept. 2008).
14. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Integrated Science Assessment for Oxides of
Nitrogen-Health Criteria, EPA/600/R-08/071 (July 2008). See also N.Y. STATE
ENERGY PLANNING BOARD, THE ENERGY TO LEAD, IMPACTS & CONSIDERATIONS 8
(2015) [hereinafter ENERGY TO LEAD].
15. Burt, et al., supra note 11, at 8.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 9 (citing WORLD HEALTH ORG. (WHO), Exposure to Mercury: A Major
Public Health Concern. Public Health and Environment 3 (2007)).
18. This argument is made despite the majority of cost-benefit studies showing a
net benefit from solar. See Josh Garskof, How Utilities Are Fighting Back on Solar
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health and environmental costs of coal generation were included,
consumer bills could triple.19 Some studies suggest that if all external
costs of generating coal-fired electricity were accounted for, such costs
would increase the price of electricity by 17.8 cents per kilowatt
hour,20 reaching $500 billion annually.21 Other estimates accounting
for the true cost of coal-fired electricity, namely environmental
damage and impacts to public health, set the total price of electricity
as high as 45 cents per kilowatt hour.22
Given the high environmental and public health costs associated
with coal generation, it is not surprising that many states such as New
York are making strong public policy decisions to advance the
proliferation of renewable resources. Shifting to cleaner, renewable
sources of energy generation such as solar while decreasing coal usage
can benefit the climate, public health, and the economy. Experts
predict that the “public health benefits associated with reduced
operating time of fossil-fuel generators can exceed $300,000 for each
reduced ton of fine particulate emissions” before even considering the
environmental and public health benefits of reducing sulfur dioxide
and nitrogen dioxide emissions.23
Experts recognize that coordinated energy systems planning is
essential for states “to comprehensively analyze and respond to
emerging affordability, environmental, reliability, economic planning
and national security effects of supplying energy.”24 Since the turn of
Power, CONSUMER REPS. (June 30, 2016), https://www.consumerreports.org/energysaving/how-utilities-are-fighting-back-on-solar-power/.
19. Burt, et al., supra note 11, at 10.
20. Kilowatt hours is the unit of measurement used to describe the amount of
energy consumers use. See Charles M. Pratt, Electric Regulation in the State of New
York, ASS’N BAR CITY NEW YORK COMM. ON ENERGY 1, 5, n.7 (Feb. 9, 2007),
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/Dereg_report.pdf. Kilowatts are also used to
express the amount of electric power that customers demand and a generator’s ability
to supply that demand with its generating capacity. See id. at 5, n.8.
21. Paul R. Epstein, Full Cost Accounting for the Life Cycle of Coal, 1219 ANN.
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 73, 73 (2011).
22. Ben Machol & Sarah Rizk, Economic Value of U.S. Fossil Fuel Electricity
Health Impacts, ENV’T INT’L 52, 75-80 (Feb. 2013).
23. Richard L. Revesz & Burcin Unel, Managing the Future of the Electricity
Grid: Distributed Generation and Net Metering, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 43, 91–
2 (2017).
24. Pratt, supra note 20, at 24.
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the century, New York’s Committee on Energy has suggested that “the
State’s most significant energy issue is the encouragement of
construction of new generating capacity in regions of the State where
it is needed.”25 Multiple reports and studies conducted throughout the
early 2000s indicated that New York would face an energy supply
shortage if it did not take steps to increase capacity.26 Thus, the New
York State Committee on Energy concluded in 2007 that “steps should
be taken to facilitate the addition of new generating capacity.”27
New York’s challenge is the same one that the global community
now faces: determining how to ensure generating capacity,
transmission, and distribution in ways that safeguard public health,
protect the environment, and reduce contributions to global warming.28
Even before President Trump withdrew from the Paris Agreement,
New York was grappling with this challenge and attempting to resolve
it with Cuomo’s 2014 Reforming the Energy Vision (REV) initiative.
REV seeks to transform the energy market in New York, with the hope
of charting a path forward that other states may follow.
REV is ambitious in what it seeks to accomplish. The initiative is
situated in largely unchartered territory and it is not without its fair
share of criticism. Even cautious optimism may be premature, as
leading experts note that “[n]othing like the REV has ever been done
before. As such, its success, even as a deregulatory measure, must be
considered contingent and uncertain.”29 REV is a series of collective,
interrelated experiments on a massive scale. Given the dire effects of
climate change and the public health impacts of energy production, the
stakes of this experiment have never been higher. Many regulators and
stakeholders question how the vision will be put into practice – a
Herculean or Sisyphean task (or both), depending on who weighs in:
25. Id. at 25.
26. See e.g. NYISO, The Comprehensive Reliability Planning Process Reliability

Needs Assessment, 4 (Dec. 21, 2005) (finding that, “because of load growth and no
resource additions, the forecasted system for the next five years did not meet
reliability criteria, meaning the system was not adequate to safely meet consumers
energy requirements at all times in the face of scheduled and unscheduled outages”).
See also New York City Energy Policy Task Force, New York City Energy Policy:
An Electricity Resource Roadmap, 9-12 (Jan. 2004), http://www.nyc.gov/html/
om/pdf/energy_task_force.pdf.
27. Pratt, supra note 20, at 11.
28. Id. at 25.
29. Ratzkin, supra note 9, at 476.
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[t]he REV has been called, even by its advocates, ‘devilishly
complex’ . . . it promises to be a highly bureaucratic
endeavor. Indeed, even among many people who should
know – such as key industry participants and environmental
advocates – it is hard to find individuals who profess truly to
understand the REV. Given that lack of understanding, how
can we, whether as citizens or policy makers, really be sure
that the REV will deliver on its generalized emissions
reduction promises?30
Getting REV right would have significant, far-reaching impacts. A
key component of REV is the integration of clean, renewable sources
of energy generation into the electric grid. The successful integration
of these resources – called Distributed Energy Resources or DERs –
can have far-reaching impacts not just in terms of energy, but also in
terms of agriculture, water, and land use. For example, the installation
of solar panels (called distributed solar generation) can “improve water
quality and address land degradation issues exacerbated by fossil fuel
power plants.”31 The REV experiment strikes right at the intersection
of energy, agriculture, water, and land use issues, all of which are tied
to climate change.
If implemented properly – and if successful – REV has the potential
to reduce emissions from the two largest sectors of society contributing
to climate change: electricity and agriculture.32 Energy and food
systems are inextricably intertwined. Many call the challenges arising
from the intersection of these fields “wicked problems” because they
escape resolution by any single solution.33 Alternative energy systems,
such as the nascent DER market in New York, could provide a
potential systems-based solution that addresses the challenges in both
the energy and agricultural sectors. For example, placing renewable
30. Id.
31. Revesz & Unel, supra note 23, at 92.
32. MICHAEL BLOOMBERG & CARL POPE, CLIMATE OF HOPE: HOW CITIES,

BUSINESSES, AND CITIZENS CAN SAVE THE PLANET 155 (St. Martin’s Press 2017).
Electricity and heat production account for 25% of GHGs, while agriculture and
forestry account for 24%. See id.
33. Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin. M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of
Planning, 4 POL’Y SCI. 155, 160-69 (1973) (coining the phrase “wicked problems”
to describe the particularly difficult-to-solve social policy problems).
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energy systems like solar panels and anaerobic digesters onto farm
land could shift reliance away from carbon-emitting sources of energy,
thereby reducing GHGs. However, creating this shift requires
implementing public polices targeted at incentivizing and regulating
this developing market in ways that both maximize the value of DERs
to the grid and local food systems and provide adequate consumer
protection measures, especially for farmers.
This article argues for the necessity of implementing adequate
consumer protection measures in the retail access energy market
before distributed energy resources can be successfully integrated on
farms to mitigate climate change. Using New York’s retail access
energy market as an analytical lens, this Article proceeds in three parts.
Part I discusses how energy production and consumption impact
public health, especially for vulnerable populations, resulting in the
need for unique regulation of this sector. Part II describes New York’s
history of regulation and deregulation of the energy sector and
concludes with recent energy initiatives. Part III details a series of
concerns related to these new initiatives and proposes policy
recommendations for correcting market abuses and implementing
additional consumer protection measures in the retail access energy
market.
I.

ENERGY ISSUES ARE PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUES

Experts have recognized that access to safe and reliable electricity
is necessary “for achieving good health and lack of access to it as ‘one
of the principal barriers to the fulfillment of human potential and wellbeing.’”34 One need only consider recent power outages from the 2017
hurricane season to observe the crippling effects of losing access to
this vital resource. For example, after Hurricane Irma tore through the
Atlantic, Florida Power and Light’s president and CEO, Eric Silagy,
estimated that half of Florida’s population was without power –
totaling nearly 10 million people.35 In such instances, access to power
34. ENERGY TO LEAD, supra note 14, at 64 (quoting Anil Markandya, Electricity
Generation and Health, THE LANCET 370, 979-90 (2007)).
35. Katie Zezima, Officials: Half of Florida lacks power, THE WASH. POST (Sept.
11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/2017/live-updates/weather/
hurricane-irma-a-monster-storms-devastating-path/officials-half-of-florida-lackspower/?utm_term=.d735bebd1850 [https://perma.cc/AFD2-P6P7].
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can quickly become life or death; lack of access to life supporting
machines in nursing homes and hospitals, exposure and heat
exhaustion, and carbon monoxide poisoning from generators can all
result from power outages.36
Absence of reliable energy also exacts an emotional toll. Months
after Hurricane Maria tore through Puerto Rico, half of the electric grid
was still down.37 Reports of the rising toll on Puerto Ricans’ mental
health was in the news, despite not commanding the same attention as
the visible wounds and downed power lines.38 The psychological and
physiological stress is far from over; estimates still predict parts of the
island could remain dark for months.39
In addition to natural disasters, world events and politics can create
fuel shortages (consider America’s energy crisis in the 1970s resulting
from the 1973 OPEC oil embargo), as can climate extremes in the
absence of any storm (such as sustained droughts decreasing
Venezuela’s ability to harness electricity due to the country sourcing
70% of its electric generation from hydropower facilities).40 Despite
awareness that “health depends on political as well as social, economic
and cultural forces,” there are very few studies examining the effect
that politics has on health, especially when those politics implicate
energy demand and therefore influence public health outcomes.41
Nevertheless, if politics is defined as “who gets what, when and how,”
it stands to reason that politics necessarily effect how public policy
36. See e.g., Jim Turner, Hurricane Irma death toll in Florida at 34 – and rising,
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (Sept. 18, 2017), http://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/
2017/09/18/irma-death-toll-florida-34-and-rising/677493001/
[https://perma.cc/VQZ6-LDEB].
37. See Quil Lawrence, In Puerto Rico, The Crisis After Hurricane Maria is
Taxing Residents’ Mental Health, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 13, 2017),
https://www.npr.org/2017/11/13/563894775/in-puerto-rico-the-crisis-afterhurricane-maria-is-taxing-residents-mental-healt [https://perma.cc/F4XK-ZYMV].
38. See id.
39. See Frances Robles & Patricia Mazzei, Parts of Puerto Rico Won’t Have
Power for 8 Months. What’s the Holdup?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/23/us/puerto-rico-power-outage.html
[https://perma.cc/NG53-YT9E].
40. See Gretchen Bakke, The Electricity Crisis in Venezuela: A Cautionary Tale,
THE NEW YORKER (May 17, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/theelectricity-crisis-in-venezuela-a-cautionary-tale [https://perma.cc/U8M5-43CX].
41. Vincent Navarro, Politics and Health: A Neglected Area of Research, 18 EUR.
J. OF PUB. HEALTH 354 (2008).
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may be implemented in the health sector.42 Because politics often
determines who receives what services subsidized by whom, it follows
that public policy can influence energy demand, thereby implicating
health outcomes.
Beyond natural disasters, international relations, politics, and
extreme climatic conditions such as drought, poverty is another factor
depriving entire communities of safe or reliable access to electricity.
Current estimates suggest that 12.7% of the U.S. population43 lives in
poverty – a total of 40.6 million people.44 In addition to income level,
energy burden is an important indicator of whether a family is likely
to experience a lack of access to energy. One’s energy burden is “the
percentage of a customer’s income spent on energy.”45 Experts
calculate that an energy burden greater than 6% renders energy
unaffordable.46 Lower-income households bear energy burdens of 1020%. This is far higher than the energy burden carried by middle-toupper income households, which typically carry energy burdens of 15%.47 Energy burdens above 6% that suggest the cost of energy is
unaffordable are significant because “[n]umerous studies have
established the link between energy unaffordability and poor health
outcomes. In particular, utility shutoffs, bill debt, and inefficient
weatherization have been linked to increased cases of pneumonia,
bronchitis, other illnesses, and hunger among low-income
communities.”48 Due to the high social costs of energy unaffordability,
federal and state financial assistance programs exist to help low-

42. Amanda Glassman & Kent Buse, Politics, and Public Health Policy Reform,
5 INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. HEALTH 163 (2008).
43. See JESSICA L. SEMEGA ET AL., INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2016 12 (U.S. Census Bureau ed., 2017).
44. See id. For a one-person household, the poverty level was set at $12,228 in
2016 (gross income), $15,569 for a family of two, and $24,563 for a family of four.
See id. at 43.
45. Adrienne L. Thompson, Protecting Low-Income Ratepayers As the
Electricity System Evolves, 37 ENERGY L. J. 265, 268–69 (2016).
46. See Adam Chandler, Where the Poor Spend More Than 10 Percent of Their
Income on Energy, THE ATLANTIC (June 8, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/
business/archive/2016/06/energy-poverty-low-income-households/486197/
[https://perma.cc/N9GM-6DHP].
47. See id.
48. See Thompson, supra note 45, at 270.
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income families pay their energy bills.49 Nevertheless, such programs
do not provide sufficient assistance to everyone in need.50
High energy burdens and government assistance programs that fail
to fill the gaps mean that many consumers must make a Hobson’s
choice every month: deciding whether to pay the energy bill or whether
to pay for other vital needs such as medical services and food.51 In
New York alone, more than one quarter-million customers every year
experience involuntary utility shut-offs, while one in eight residential
New York customers have a utility bill more than two months in
arrears.52 Addressing the energy burdens consumers face must be a key
consideration of any public policy seeking to shift energy consumption
away from fossil fuels and towards renewable sources:
[b]ecause these ratepayers already carry a significantly
higher energy burden than other customers, they are
particularly vulnerable to rising costs and to the rate
structure reforms contemplated in most grid modernization
processes active today. The question becomes, then: as these
49. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV., Energy Assistance, BENEFITS
(2017), https://www.benefits.gov/benefits/browse-by-category/category/27. The
program eligibility requirements for participating in the federal Low Income Home
Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) are calculated based on income level and the
percentage of income spent on energy bills; for example, to qualify, a one-person
household must earn less than $17,820 per year, a two-person household less than
$24,030, and a four-person household less than $36,450; see also U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUM. SERV., Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program
(LIHEAP), BENEFITS (2017), https://www.benefits.gov/benefits/benefit-details/623
[hereinafter LIHEAP].
50. See Chandler, supra note 46. For example, in North Carolina, less than 50
percent of families in need received adequate financial assistance. See id. Moreover,
less than a quarter of families who meet LIHEAP eligibility requirements actually
receive those benefits. See GENE FALK ET AL., NEED-TESTED BENEFITS: ESTIMATED
ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFIT RECEIPT BY FAMILIES AND INDIVIDUALS 39
(Congressional Research Service ed., 2015).
51. See Chandler, supra note 46; see also Dan Boyce & Jordan Wirfs-Brock,
Energy Assistance Struggles to Meet Demand, COLORADOAN (May 24, 2016),
http://www.coloradoan.com/story/news/2016/05/23/energy-assistance-programsstruggle-meet-demand-low-income-coloradans/84812402/ [http://perma.cc/KEA7UVLE].
52. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Adopting Regulatory Policy
Framework and Implementation Plan, Case 14-M-0101 (Feb. 26, 2015).
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electricity system reforms proceed, what policies can be
implemented to complement the overarching goals of these
reforms, while also protecting low-income customers?53
Integrating renewable sources of energy into the electric grid is
necessary to help states like New York fulfill their environmental
pledges. Yet, policy makers must keep in mind that the goal cannot be
renewables at any cost. The need for integrating renewable resources
into the electric grid must be balanced with providing necessary
consumer protections to ensure ratepayers already facing
insurmountable energy burdens are not paying more than necessary.54
II. REGULATING NEW YORK’S ELECTRICITY MARKET
High energy prices motivated the restructuring of New York’s
electricity market in the 1990s. New York’s electricity market was
originally a regulated monopoly. The utilities were vertically
integrated entities, meaning that they provided consumers with the
generation, transmission, distribution, and sale of electricity. New
York began efforts to deregulate or restructure its electricity market by
allowing entities other than utilities to sell electricity to end-users.55
The restructuring process attempted to replace the monopoly system
of electric utilities with an open, competitive market for consumers to
select electricity suppliers while still receiving delivery through the
same local utilities’ power lines.56 The New York State Public Service
Commission (the Commission) envisioned allowing additional
participants into the commodity market to encourage competition,
provide better commodity service, offer diverse energy products with
added value, and lower costs for consumers.57
53. Thompson, supra note 45, at 285.
54. See infra Part II.B.
55. New York also permitted other entities to sell the commodity of natural gas

to end-users, but this article focuses solely on the electric industry. See e.g., See State
of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Address
Issues Associated with the Restructuring of the Emerging Competitive Natural Gas
Market, Case 93-G-0932 (Dec. 20, 1994).
56. See “Restructuring,” Glossary, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (2017),
https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=R.
57. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, In the Matter of Competitive
Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, Opinion and Order Regarding
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A. The Process of Restructuring: 1990s
In lieu of regulating electric utilities as monopolies, the Commission
has been committed for decades to encouraging competition with the
hope of lower prices for consumers.58 The Commission set about
restructuring New York’s electricity market in reliance on its
experiences in the natural gas and telecommunications industries,
noting that “[w]here genuine competition has replaced regulated
monopoly, customers have had little reason for regret.”59 Policy
makers in the state believed that allowing competition would
encourage lower prices through increased energy efficiency and
demand response efforts.60
Energy efficiency refers to the conservation of energy and a
reduction in the amount of energy used. Improved energy efficiency
increases the electricity generation and transmission capacity that can
then be dedicated elsewhere.61 Common energy efficiency measures
include air sealing and insulating buildings or purchasing certified
Competitive Opportunities for Electric Service, Case 94-E-0952 (May 20, 1996); see
also Stephen P. Sherwin, Deregulation of Electricity in New York: A Continuing
Odyssey 1996-2001, 12 ALB. J. SCI. & TECH. 263, 268-70 (2001). Given that the
Commission still possesses some regulatory authority over the electricity market
(including the utilities and other market participants), this article asserts that New
York’s deregulation of its electricity markets is more properly described by the term
“restructuring” rather than “deregulation” and therefore uses the former term.
58. See e.g., Restructuring of the Emerging Competitive Natural Gas Market,
supra note 57; see also State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Proceeding on Motion of
the Commission to Examine Issues Related to the Continuing Provision of Universal
Service and to Develop a Regulatory Framework for the Transition to Competition
in the Local Exchange Market, Case 94-C-0095 (May 22, 1996).
59. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service,
supra note 57.
60. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service,
supra note 57. Notably, at this time, ESCOs offer demand response programs only
to large commercial and industrial customers – not to mass market customers. See
State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, In the Matter of Eligibility Criteria for Energy
Service Companies et al., Case 15-M-0127 (Dec. 12, 2017) (cross-examination
testimony of the Impacted ESCO Coalition, admitting they do not offer demand
response programs to residential customers despite claiming demand response
programs as one of the unique value-added services that they provide above the
default utility service).
61. See Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, An Illustrative Framework for
a Clean Energy Standard for The Power Sector 5 (2011).
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energy efficient household appliances.62 Such energy efficiency
measures can be considered a type of DER because these measures
generate energy savings, often calculated in terms of “negawatts,” that
can then be used elsewhere in the grid.63
In contrast, demand response programs rely on consumers to
voluntarily participate in programs that encourage the adjustment of
energy usage to certain times of day when there is less demand on the
power grid or when more renewable energy is available.64 Successful
demand response programs provide consumers with the opportunity to
receive incentives in return for reducing non-essential energy use or
shifting use to non-peak energy consumption times of the day.65 In
addition, demand response programs reduce congestion on the electric
grid and contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emissions created from
residential and commercial sectors of the energy market.66 For
example, the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO)67
facilitates two types of demand response programs: reliability-based
demand response programs and economic-based demand response
programs.68 The purpose of NYISO’s reliability-based programs is to
relieve stress on the grid when demand for electricity is above the
normal peak period levels due to unplanned events like extreme heat,
inclement weather, and transmission outages.69 In return for load
reduction when the electric grid is stressed, consumers are provided
with monetary compensation.70 Similarly, the economic-based
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See id.
See id.
See ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, WHAT IS DEMAND RESPONSE? (2014).
See id.
See id.
The NYISO regulates New York’s transmission facilities to ensure the
reliability of the state’s power system and coordinates the wholesale market
(including daily purchases of electricity and related operations) to distribute the
electricity supply throughout the state. See NEW YORK INDEPENDENT SYSTEM
OPERATOR (2018), https://home.nyiso.com/.
68. NYISO DEMAND RESPONSE PROGRAMS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
(FAQS) FOR PROSPECTIVE RESOURCES, NEW YORK INDEPENDENT SYSTEM
OPERATOR (2016). The two programs within the reliability-based category are the
Installed Capacity – Special Case Resource Program and the Emergency Demand
Response Program.
69. See id. at 1.
70. See id.
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demand response programs also seek to reduce load demand.71
However, the economic-based programs are different in that they
allow consumers the opportunity to receive compensation at any time
for participating in load reduction, regardless of the reliability needs
of the grid.72
In seeking lower prices for consumers through energy efficiency and
demand response efforts, regulators responsible for restructuring New
York’s electricity market aimed to do so in accordance with the
principles of resource management, customer service, reliability and
safety, competitive market characteristics, and economic
efficiency/development.73 During the ensuing collaborative
restructuring process, all stakeholders agreed on the general principles
but they disagreed on which principles were primary.74 For example,
the Commission emphasized the “economic and environmental wellbeing” of the state and opined that this principle was primary above all
others.75 In contrast, the state Consumer Protection Board argued for a
stronger focus on reducing rates for all consumers. The environmental
agencies (i.e. the State Energy Office, the Department of
Environmental Quality, and the New York State Energy Research and
Development Authority [NYSERDA]) took a third position,
advocating for additional policy guidance on transitioning to more
robust competition.76

71. See id. at 2. The two programs that are economically based include: the Day
Ahead Demand Response Program and the Demand-Side Ancillary Services
Program.
72. See id. at 2.
73. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service,
supra note 57. Fourteen other states and the District of Columbia also have
restructured or deregulated their electricity and gas energy markets (California,
Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia), while other states have
partially or fully restructured the electricity or the gas retail access market. See Map
of Deregulated Energy States and Markets (Updated 2017), ELECTRIC CHOICE
(2017), https://www.electricchoice.com/map-deregulated-energy-markets/.
74. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service,
supra note 57.
75. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service,
supra note 57.
76. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service,
supra note 57.
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Despite general agreement to transition New York’s energy industry
away from a regulated monopoly and towards a competitive market,
the process involved several complexities. Shifting from a regulated
monopoly to a competitive market required grappling with a loss of
tax revenue,77 managing utility investor expectations,78 achieving
environmental goals,79 and fulfilling social responsibilities.80 Since the
early 1990’s the Commission warned of the need for coordination of
resources in transitioning to a competitive market, lest “any substantial
near term reduction in prices and/or bills for some customers . . .
largely come at the expense of increased prices to others.”81 The
themes of balancing costs for consumers, mitigating environmental
harm, and striving for interagency coordination recurred throughout
the restructuring process.
Beginning in 1996, the Commission (1) directed the electric
utilities’ divesture of their generation facilities, (2) coordinated with
the NYISO in its operation of the state’s wholesale energy market and
bulk power transmission system, and (3) permitted the entry of Electric
Service Companies (ESCOs) into the retail market space to compete
with utilities for the opportunity to sell electricity to end-users.82 The
77. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service,
supra note 57. When deregulation efforts began in New York, utilities paid state and
local taxes to the tune of $2.1 billion per year. See id. Projections anticipated that the
next decade would generate $30 billion of tax revenue. See id. The utilities’ tax costs
are passed on to consumers. See MARILYN M. RUBIN, A GUIDE TO NEW YORK STATE
TAXES: HISTORY, ISSUES AND CONCERNS vi (2011) (explaining that New York
utilities must pay the State Gross Receipts and 9A Corporation Franchise Taxes,
local business income and gross receipts taxes, state and local sales taxes, and local
property taxes).
78. Utility investors in New York have historically been confident in recovering
their prudent investment costs through the rate setting process. See In the Matter of
Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, supra note 57.
79. For example, utilities might purchase certain amounts of renewable resource
generation, promote energy efficiency programs, or educate consumers about
demand side management (DSM) or demand-side response (DSR) incentives. See In
the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, supra note 57.
80. For example, continuing to administer New York’s Low-Income Home
Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). See LIHEAP, supra note 49.
81. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service,
supra note 57.
82. COMMITTEE ON ENERGY, ELECTRIC REGULATION IN THE STATE OF N.Y. 1
(The Association of the Bar of the City of New York ed. 2007). Note, the
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NYISO operates wholesale market transactions involving generation
and bulk power transmission facilities.83 In contrast, the retail markets
in which utilities and ESCOs operate include the sale and delivery of
energy and capacity to end-users.84 The restructuring of New York’s
electric industry thus required utilities to divest their generation
facilities so that they no longer supply end users with electricity
derived from their own generating sources.85 As a result of the
restructuring process, load-serving entities (LSE), which are utilities
or ESCOs, have three options to source generation capacity: (1) LSEs
with long-term power supply agreements executed prior to
restructuring may finish the terms of these legacy agreements; (2)
LSEs may maintain multiple medium-term and short-term power
supply agreements in their supply portfolios; and (3) LSEs may make
capacity purchases in the markets that the NYISO administers.86
B. Concerns in the Restructured Market Place
As noted above, the restructuring process involved the entry of
ESCOs into the retail energy market to compete with the utilities to
sell energy commodities (i.e. natural gas and electricity) directly to
New York residents, small business owners, and commercial and
industrial customers.87 The Commission’s purpose in allowing ESCOs
to compete with the utilities in the retail energy market was twofold.
First, the Commission sought to increase competition in the hopes of
lowering the price of energy. Second, the Commission sought to create
space for energy suppliers to innovate by providing consumers with a
range of other valuable energy products, such as energy efficiency or
Commission possesses no direct regulatory authority over NYISO, as the NYISO’s
management of the competitive wholesale market falls under the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) authority. FERC authorized the creation of the
NYISO in 1998. Order Rejecting Revised Compliance Filing, Federal Energy
Guidelines: FERC Reports (FERC), 83 FERC ¶ 61,352 (Oct. 28, 1999).
83. See COMMITTEE ON ENERGY, supra note 82. The NYISO oversees auction
markets for electric energy, electric capacity, and all ancillary services such as
maintaining sufficient operating reserves, control and dispatch, and the capability to
start generators in the event of a system shutdown. See id. at 5.
84. See id. at 6.
85. See id. at 9-10.
86. See id. at 5-7.
87. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service,
supra note 57.
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demand response measures.88 Regulators also anticipated that ESCOs
would eventually offer consumers lower energy prices compared to
utilities by finding more efficient and innovative ways to purchase
energy on the wholesale market and passing the savings on to
consumers.89 The Commission expected the market to “produce, over
time, rates that will be lower than they would be under a regulated
environment.”90
1. History of Proceedings and Problems in the Retail Energy
Market
The Commission’s ultimate goal was not merely to provide ESCOs
with access to the retail energy market; rather, ESCOs were a means
to achieving the end of providing consumers with lower energy prices
and other valuable benefits.91 The Commission recognized that market
restructuring was an evolutionary process requiring oversight and
regulation because retail competition was fraught with “significant
risks and requires considerable caution, and should be provided only
if it is in the best interests of all consumers.”92 Accordingly, the

88. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service,
supra note 57; see also Sherwin, supra note 57, at 268-70. At the evidentiary hearing,
New York Department of Services Staff (“DPS Staff”) testified that they had
reviewed the various products ESCOs claimed to offer and compared those products
to the prices ESCOs were charging above default utility service. For example, for
ESCOs claiming to offer value added services such as LED lightbulbs and
thermostats, DPS Staff explained that “those products are variously available as a
general commodity in hardware stores, Lowes, Home Depot, at a very reasonable
price. And therefore, any premium associated for those products offered by the
ESCO, that value was not commensurate with the premium that the ESCOs were
charging for those products.” See In the Matter of Eligibility Criteria for Energy
Service Companies et al., supra note 60, at 2500-01.
89. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service,
supra note 57, at 30-39.
90. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service,
supra note 57, at 28-30.
91. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service,
supra note 57, at 30-33.
92. See In the Matter of Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service,
supra note 57, at 13 (quoting recommended decision of Administrative Law Judge).
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Commission committed itself to monitoring market development and
stated that it would “take corrective action should problems arise.”93
a. The Commission Creates (and Repeatedly Revises) a Set of
Uniform Business Practices
At first, the Commission monitored the market by creating an
eligibility process for ESCOs seeking to enter the retail energy
market.94 Once the Commission deemed an ESCO eligible, the ESCO
could then sell electricity and gas directly to consumers.95 To ensure
adequate consumer protections in this new competitive market, in
February 1999 the Commission established the Uniform Business
93. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Opinion and Order Establishing
Regulatory Policies for the Provision of Retail Energy Services, Case 94-E-0952
(May 19, 1997).
94. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Uniform Business Practices, Case 98M-1343 (2014). As of 2015, such requirements included, among others, providing a
sample standard sales agreement for each customer class, procedures for obtaining
customer authorization for the ESCO to access customers’ historic usage, internal
procedures to prevent unauthorized switching of customer accounts from utilities to
ESCOs (slamming), copies of marketing materials, copies of the ESCOs’ quality
assurance program, disclosure of any criminal or regulatory sanctions imposed
against any senior officers of the ESCO in the last three years, and a list of all thirdparty agents the ESCO contracted with to market to potential customers. See id. at
6-7.
95. See Uniform Business Practices, supra note 94, at 2 (defining ESCOs as
entities “eligible to sell electricity and/or natural gas to end-use customers using the
transmission or distribution system of a utility” and stating that such ESCOs “may
perform other retail service functions”). New York has a long-standing public policy
of prioritizing residents’ access to commodity energy services, recognizing that such
access is central to protecting the health, safety, and welfare of citizens. See Home
Energy Fair Practices Act and Energy Consumer Protection Act, Public Service Law,
Art. 2 § 44(1)(30) (2003) (“HEFPA”) (the “continued provision of . . . gas, electric
and steam service to all residential customers without unreasonable qualifications or
lengthy delays is necessary for the preservation of the health and general welfare and
is in the public interest.”). HEFPA provides New York residents with various
consumer protections, such as procedures for customer billing, payment, and
complaints. See e.g., id. at § 32 (termination); id. at § 33-34 (multiple dwelling shutoffs); id. at § 35 (reconnection); id. at § 36 (deposits); id. at § 37 (deferred payments);
id. at § 38 (budget plans); id. at § 40 (third-party notice before termination). The New
York Legislature extended these protections to ESCO customers through the Energy
Consumer Protection Act of 2002. See Energy Consumer Protection Act, N.Y. STAT.
L. 2002, CH. 686. (2002).
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Practices (UBP). The UBP provides a minimum set of guidelines to
which ESCOs must adhere to maintain their eligibility to serve retail
customers.96 The UBP is intended to standardize practices among the
utilities and the ESCOs to protect consumers.97
Since establishing the UBP, the Commission has modified them
several times to address changes in the market and the enhanced need
for consumer protection. For example, on October 15, 2008, the
Commission amended the UBP in response to ESCOs employing
improper marketing practices.98 In its October 2008 Order, the
Commission attempted to enhance the marketing standards to “provide
even greater confidence and security to consumers.”99 In 2010, the
Commission further amended the UBP, requiring ESCOs to provide
consumers with notice of a Consumer Bill of Rights whenever retail
services are offered.100 Due to ESCOs’ continued questionable
marketing behavior (and behavior of their sales agents), the Consumer
Bill of Rights provides, among other things: “[n]o person who sells or
offers for sale any energy services for, or on behalf of, an ESCO shall
engage in any deceptive acts or practices in the marketing of energy
services.”101 In addition, the ESCO Consumer Bill of Rights expressly
permits the New York State Attorney General to bring a civil action
against any ESCO suspected of violating the Bill of Rights
provisions.102 The Consumer Bill of Rights also authorizes citizen suit
provisions as another means of seeking redress for violations.103 The
Commission amended the UBP yet again on February 25, 2014,

96. See Uniform Business Practices, supra note 94.
97. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Opinion and Order Concerning

Uniform Business Practices, Case 98-M-1343 (1999).
98. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Adopting Amendments to the
Uniform Business Practices, Case 98-M-1343 (2008).
99. Press Release, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n (Oct. 15, 2008) (on file with author).
100. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Implementing Chapter 416 of
the Laws of 2010, Case 98-M-1343 (2010); see also Energy Services Company
Consumers Bill of Rights, § 349-d (2011).
101. See Energy Services Company Consumers Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at
§ 349-d(3).
102. See Energy Services Company Consumers Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at
§ 349-d(9).
103. See Energy Services Company Consumers Bill of Rights, supra note 100, at
§ 349-d(10).
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requiring greater transparency of ESCO prices to protect mass market
customers (i.e. residential and small business customers).104
b.

The New York State Attorney General Investigates

Despite the additional consumer protections contained in the UBP,
abuses persisted in the market place. Years of Attorney General
investigations have revealed hundreds of customer complaints related
to deceptive ESCO marketing tactics.105 For example, customers
complained of being charged higher prices, not receiving promised
savings on their energy bills, and being the recipients of harassing
door-to-door sales behavior. Customers also expressed that ESCO
sales agents demonstrated a general disregard of the UBP consumer
protection provisions, including failing to provide customers with a
written copy of the ESCO Consumer’s Bill of Rights and failing to
provide customers with written notice of the right to cancel contracts
within three days.106 Since 2000, the Attorney General’s investigations
have resulted in eight settlements that provided injunctive relief and
millions of dollars in restitution and penalties.107
104. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Taking Actions to Improve the
Residential and Small Non-residential Retail Access Markets, Case 12-M-0476
(2014).
105. It is also important to recognize that the number of complaints “is typically
the tip of the iceberg.” See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, In the Matter of
Eligibility Criteria for Energy Service Companies et al., Case 15-M-0127 (2017)
(NYAG expert witness Jane Azia testifying to the NYAG complain rates for ESCO
customers). For example, in HIKO, the NYAG received “about 300 complaints over
three years as the time period that was covered by the settlement, but refunds were
made to approximately 2,500 people who were found to be eligible.” Id. at 1794-95.
106. See THOMAS P. DINAPOLI, OVERSIGHT OF COMPLAINT ACTIVITY 8 (New
York State Office of the State Comptroller ed., 2017) (auditing the period from
January 1, 2012 through August 19, 2016 and finding 150% increase in complaints,
from 1,956 to 4,922).
107. See e.g., In the Matter of Total Gas & Electric, Inc., Assurance of
Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law §63 (15) (Mar. 9, 2001) [hereinafter
TG&E AOD]; People v. ECONnergy Energy Co., N.Y. Cnty. Sup. Ct. No.
401384/02 (Sept. 23, 2003) [hereinafter ECON Consent Judgment]; People v.
ECONnergy Energy Co., N.Y. County Supreme Court Index No. 401384/02 (filed
Mar. 26, 2002) [hereinafter ECON Petition]; In the Matter of New York Energy
Savings Corp., Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law § 63(15)
(July 14, 2008) [hereinafter U.S. Energy Savings AOD]; In the Matter of New York
Energy Savings Corp., Addendum to the Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to
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For example, the Attorney General’s Office launched an
investigation of Energy Plus, a Delaware-based ESCO serving New
Yorkers with its principal offices in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.108 As
a result of this investigation, the Attorney General’s Office concluded
that Energy Plus had made false and misleading savings claims to
customers, failed to fully disclose the extent of its early termination
fees, and did not clearly disclose other material terms and conditions
of its contracts as required under the UBP and the New York’s General
Business Law and Executive Law.109 Energy Plus’ website and written
advertising materials claimed that its prices were lower than, or
competitive with, the prices that the utilities were charging consumers.
For example, a review of Energy Plus’ direct mail offers revealed that
the company claimed its energy rates were “market based” and
“competitive” or “risk-free.”110 However, the investigation revealed
that Energy Plus customers were paying up to $440 more per year than
similarly situated customers receiving commodity service from the
default utility service provider.111
In addition to paying higher commodity prices, Energy Plus
customers were also told they could cancel their contracts at any time.
However, Energy Plus routinely delayed processing such cancellations
by a period of two months, forcing consumers to continue paying

Executive Law § 63(15) (Sept. 14, 2009) [hereinafter U.S. Energy Savings AOD
Addendum]; In the Matter of Columbia Utilities, LLC, Assurance of Discontinuance
Pursuant to Executive Law § 63 (15) (Apr. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Columbia AOD];
Letter from Keith Gordon, Asst. Attorney General, Bureau of Consumer Frauds, to
Dietrich Snell, Counsel for Columbia Utilities, LLC and Columbia Utilities Power,
LLC (Feb. 28, 2014); In the Matter of the Investigation by Eric T. Schneiderman,
Attorney General of New York, of HIKO Energy, LLC, Assurance of Discontinuance
Pursuant to Executive Law § 63 (15) (Oct. 1, 2014) [hereinafter HIKO AOD]; In the
Matter of the Investigation by Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of New York,
of Energy Plus Holdings LLC and Energy Plus Natural Gas LLC, Assurance of
Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law § 63(15) (Aug. 28, 2017) [hereinafter
Energy Plus AOD]; and A.G. Schneiderman Announces $550,000 Settlement With
Energy Service Company That Illegally Deceived New York Consumers (Apr. 22,
2018),
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-550000settlement-energy-service-company-illegally-deceived (Liberty Press Release).
108. See Energy Plus AOD, supra note 107, at ¶ 8.
109. See Energy Plus AOD, supra note 107, at ¶ 13-29.
110. See Energy Plus AOD, supra note 107, at ¶ 14.
111. See Energy Plus AOD, supra note 107, at ¶ 15.
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higher rates for an additional sixty days.112 Energy Plus also induced
customers to enroll in commodity service with cash back offers and
other enrollment bonuses, but failed to disclose that such rewards were
not available until after customers had been receiving ESCO
commodity service for at least two months; in other instances,
consumers were not deemed eligible to receive the rewards until they
had been enrolled with the ESCO for a full year.113
On August 28, 2017, Energy Plus settled the claims by paying
$800,000 in restitution to the Attorney General’s Office for
distribution to former customers.114 The settlement also required
Energy Plus to meet several other conditions, including the cessation
of making misleading marketing representations and a requirement to
provide potential customers with twelve consecutive months of rate
comparisons between the local utility and Energy Plus if it wished to
make any savings claims.115 Energy Plus also agreed to implement
training and monitoring of its customer service representatives and
sales agents.116
Deceptive marketing practices were even more egregious for
ESCOs that engaged in door-to-door sales communications with
residential consumers or small business owners. The Attorney
General’s Office recently settled another case with the ESCO HIKO
after investigating the company’s door-to-door marketing practices.
HIKO is a New York corporation and was authorized by the
Commission to sell electricity and natural gas to residential and
commercial customers throughout the state.117 From 2011 to 2014,
more than 300 consumers lodged complaints with the Commission
regarding HIKO’s marketing practices, which included hiring thirdparty marketers to solicit customers through door-to-door and
telemarketing channels.118 The Attorney General’s investigation
revealed that HIKO was making misleading savings claims119 and
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See Energy Plus AOD, supra note 107, at ¶ 18.
See Energy Plus AOD, supra note 107, at ¶ 22-24.
See Energy Plus AOD, supra note 107, at Part II ¶ 15.
See Energy Plus AOD, supra note 107, at Part II ¶ 4(b).
See Energy Plus AOD, supra note 107, at Part II ¶ 7-14.
See HIKO AOD, supra note 107, at ¶ 8
See HIKO AOD, supra note 107, at ¶11-12.
For example, one sales script directed marketers to promise consumers of
energy savings of up to 7% over the course of a year on HIKO’s variable rate plan.
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failing to timely process cancellation requests.120 HIKO also engaged
in slamming – the illegal practice of enrolling customers without their
knowledge or consent.121 For example, telemarketers would create the
impression that they worked for the distribution utilities and then tell
customers they were entitled to a “rebate” that could only be processed
if the customers provided their account information.122 Once the
customers provided their account information, HIKO sales
representatives switched the customers from utility service to ESCO
service without their knowledge.123 HIKO ultimately agreed to pay
$1.25 million in restitution and adhere to other conditions similar to
those contained in the Energy Plus settlement.124 In addition, HIKO
agreed to cease all slamming practices, including representing that its
agents worked on behalf of the local distribution utility or failing to
obtain signed contracts from the customer of record.125
Following another investigation in 2011, the New York Attorney
General’s Office settled similar fraudulent marketing claims against an
ESCO named Columbia Utilities, LLC and its affiliate, Columbia
Utilities Power, LLC (collectively Columbia) for $2 million.126
Although Columbia agreed to implement training and monitoring
programs of its marketing agents similar to the programs agreed to by
HIKO and Energy Plus, customer complaints persisted. This continued
misbehavior led to a modified settlement agreement in 2014 whereby
See id. at ¶ 16. At the same time, the company’s website similarly advertised that
consumers would experience lower utility bills. See id. at ¶ 16. In fact, the
investigation revealed that consumers were routinely paying between $86 to $300
more over the course of a year than if they had remained full service customers under
the default utility’s service. See id. at ¶ 14.
120. For example, the investigation revealed several instances of consumers
calling HIKO’s customer service center to cancel their contracts but being unable to
reach anyone and they could not leave a voicemail because they received a recording
stating the mailbox was full. See id. at ¶ 27.
121. See id. at ¶ 13-30. For example, one customer complained that a HIKO sales
agent had asked to see her utility bill, claiming a need to check the customer’s rate,
and then asked for a glass of water. When the consumer left the room to fill a glass
of water, the sales agent copied the Distribution Utility account information and
falsified consent to switch the customer’s service to the ESCO. See id. at ¶ 26.
122. See id. at ¶ 20-21.
123. See id. at ¶ 20-21.
124. See id. at ¶ 21.
125. See id. at ¶ 3-7.
126. See Columbia AOD, supra note 107, at ¶ 31, 55
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Columbia agreed, among other things, to cease its door-to-door
marketing entirely.127
As early as 2008, the Attorney General’s Office executed an
Assurance of Discontinuance with New York Energy Corp., doing
business as U.S. Energy Savings, following an investigation of the
ESCO’s business practices.128 The parties executed an Addendum to
the Assurance of Discontinuance in 2009, following subsequent
settlement negotiations because consumers continued filing
complaints.129 The majority of consumer complaints fell into the same
categories the Attorney General had investigated in other ESCO cases:
promised savings that never materialized, marketers who represented
that they were affiliated with the local utility, difficulty reaching a
customer service representative through the telephone number
provided for contract cancellations, and marketers who failed to
disclose the fees associated with contract terminations outside of the
statutorily required cancellation period.130 As a condition of the
settlement, U.S. Energy Savings agreed to a number of verification
practices, including explaining that U.S. Energy Savings was not
affiliated with the local utility, verifying in writing or via recorded
phone calls that all consumer sales contracts demonstrated an actual
request to use U.S. Energy Savings as the commodity supplier,
disclosing the amount of early termination fees, and guaranteeing that
consumers had not been promised less expensive commodity rates
compared to the local utility except in instances where the ESCO could
demonstrate actual savings.131 In addition to the verification
procedures, U.S. Energy Savings also agreed to engage in a variety of
vetting and monitoring practices for its independent sales contractors.
Such vetting included requiring disclosure of any misdemeanors and
felonies in the hiring application, conducting background checks,
checking applicants’ references, and terminating contracts with
127. See Columbia AOD, supra note 107, at ¶ 46-54; see also Letter from Keith
Gordon, supra note 107. As a condition of the modified settlement agreement,
Columbia was required to seek approval from the Attorney General’s Office in the
event it wished to resume its door-to-door marketing program. See Letter from Keith
Gordon, supra note 107.
128. See generally U.S. Energy Savings AOD, supra note 107.
129. See generally U.S. Energy Savings AOD Addendum, supra note 107.
130. See U.S. Energy Savings AOD, supra note 107.
131. See U.S. Energy Savings AOD, supra note 107, at 7 ¶ 34.
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independent contractors who repeatedly failed to disclose their actual
affiliation or who falsely promised consumers immediate savings.132
Such investigations are not a recent phenomenon. The Attorney
General’s Office has been investigating ESCOs and their marketing
practices since the restructuring process began over two decades ago.
That such investigations continue – and that addendums to settlement
agreements need to be issued after consumers continue filing
complaints – suggests that additional regulatory reforms are needed.133
2. Current Proceedings
To date, the Commission has deemed approximately 200 ESCOs
eligible to provide electric and natural gas commodity service to New
132. See U.S. Energy Savings AOD, supra note 107, at 8-9.
133. For example, in 2002, the Attorney General’s Office filed a petition under

New York Executive Law § 63(12) for injunctive and monetary relief against an
ESCO called ECONnergy Energy Company, Inc., alleging that the ESCO engaged
in a variety of repeated and persistent deceptive and illegal business practices while
marketing its electricity and natural gas services. See ECON Petition, supra note 107,
at 1 ¶ 2; see also id. at 5 ¶ 17 (including actions such as slamming, misrepresenting
the identity of its doo-to-door sales agents, and misrepresenting the potential savings
customers could expect if they switched to ECONnergy’s commodity service). A
Consent Judgment and Order was issued on September 23, 2003, enjoining the
ESCO from, among other things, failing to properly secure consumer authorization
to switch residential customers to its service; misrepresenting the amount, character,
and duration of savings residential consumers could receive by switching service;
concealing the identity of its sales agents; and failing to disclose to consumers their
right to cancel doo-to-door sales contracts within three business days. See ECON
Consent Judgment, supra note 107, at 6. The Order also required ECONnergy to pay
restitution to eligible customers in the amount of $75 plus 15% of the first three
months of their ESCO commodity service bill, and to pay $300,000 to the Attorney
General’s Office in costs and penalties. See id. at 3-6. A similar settlement agreement
was reached following the Attorney General’s investigation of the ESCO Total Gas
& Electric (TG&E) in 2001. See TG&E AOD, supra note 107, at 1 ¶ 3. The Attorney
General’s Office also entered into a settlement agreement in 2000 with Con Edison
Solutions, an ESCO formed by the utility Consolidated Edison, following an
investigation that revealed the ESCO was automatically renewing fixed price
contract customers onto different contracts with new terms unless the customers
contacted the company to opt out of the automatic renewal. See Press Release,
Attorney General Reaches Settlement with Con Ed Solutions (June 8, 2000) (on file
with author). In accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement reached with
the Attorney General’s Office, Con Ed Solutions sent letters out to its customers
clearly articulating the terms of its automatic renewal policy and extended the date
by which customers could cancel these contracts. See id.
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York State consumers.134 Consumer complaints about ESCOs’ billing
and marketing practices persist, despite decades of investigations and
settlement agreements conditioning ESCOs’ ability to continue
serving mass market customers on better training and monitoring of
sales agents and better disclosure practices regarding pricing and
contract terms. Complaints about misrepresented anticipated savings,
slamming, and failure to timely process cancellation requests indicate
that the retail access energy market in New York is not working as the
Commission intended when it commenced the restructuring process.
Accordingly, in October 2012, the Commission undertook a
comprehensive review of the State’s retail markets serving residential
and small commercial customers to address concerns over ESCOs’
provision of energy to such customers, particularly low-income
consumers.135 The Commission observed:
[c]ustomers participating in utility low-income assistance
programs are more likely to obtain their energy commodity
from an ESCO than residential customers who do not
participate in these programs. Further, [Department of
Public Service] Staff reports that some ESCOs have
substantially more customers participating in the utility’s
low-income assistance programs, on a percentage basis, than
the overall population. Coupled with the fact . . . that many
residential ESCO customers pay more than had they
purchased their energy commodity from the utility, this
raises a concern that the current operation of the retail energy
markets may be in conflict with one of our statutory policy
requirements. Specifically, it is this Commission’s policy
that the continued provision of electric and natural gas
service to customers is in the public interest.136
This comprehensive review lasted for nearly two years and
culminated with the Commission issuing an order in February 2014
134. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Reset Order, Case 15-M-0127 (Feb.
2016).
135. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Instituting Proceeding and
Seeking Comments Regarding Operation of the Retail Energy Markets in New York
State, Case 12-M-0476 (Oct. 19, 2012).
136. See id. at 9.
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whereby it concluded that although many ESCOs had provided large
commercial and industrial consumers with price savings or other
valuable products, ESCOs had not provided these same benefits to
residential and small commercial consumers, including low-income
consumers.137
The Commission further determined that the retail energy market for
residential and small commercial consumers was not functioning as
intended; many ESCOs were simply “generating revenues by offering
consumers little more than higher prices” and were often reaping their
profits from low-income consumers.138 The Commission concluded
that burdening consumers with higher ESCO prices not only harmed
vulnerable low-income consumers but also undermined the
effectiveness of the public-assistance programs, which were designed
to lower overall energy bills of such consumers and decrease their
energy burden.139 To address these harms, the Commission’s February
2014 Order amended the UBP, requiring that ESCOs provide lowincome consumers with (1) a guarantee of “savings over what the
customer would otherwise pay to the utility” for energy, and/or (2)
“energy-related value-added services that are designed to reduce
customers’ overall energy bills.”140
The Commission later stayed implementation of its February 2014
Order to consider petitions for rehearing and to allow for additional
public comment on the terms conditioning ESCOs’ continued
participation in the retail energy market for low-income consumers.141
Following extensive input from various stakeholders, the Commission
issued an order in February 2015 reaffirming its determination that
ESCOs serving low-income consumers had to offer either actual
energy price savings or energy-related products of real financial
value.142 To effect implementation of its order, the Commission
ordered the Department of Public Service Staff (DPS Staff) to convene
a Collaborative by holding a series of public meetings with various
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See id. at 10-11.
See id. at 2-4.
See id. at 22-24.
See id. at 24.
See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Granting Requests for
Rehearing and Issuing a Stay, Case 12-M-0476 (Apr. 25, 2014).
142. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Granting Requests for
Rehearing and Issuing a Stay, Case 12-M-0476 (Feb. 6, 2015).
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stakeholders, including several ESCOs and their related trade
associations, all major New York utilities, and consumer advocates
including the Utility Intervention Unit (UIU),143 the Public Utility Law
Project (PULP),144 the American Association of Retired Persons
(AARP),145 and the City of New York.146
Following a year of meetings and discussions throughout 2015, the
Collaborative issued an extensive report, concluding that “few, if any,
ESCOs intend to offer a product which guarantees that the customer
will pay no more than [he/she] would have been paid had energy been
purchased from the utility.”147 In seeking to preserve the effectiveness
of financial assistance programs, the Collaborative noted that any
fixed-price product (i.e. an ESCO plan setting a fixed monthly price
for energy measured per kilowatt hour rather than a price that
fluctuates with the market) that ultimately charged low-income
consumers more for energy than the utility would have charged did not
provide low-income consumers with any real financial savings.148
143. The Utility Intervention Unit, housed within the Division of Consumer
Protection of the New York Department of State, advocates on behalf of all New
Yorkers in all proceedings concerning the affordability of and access to electricity
and natural gas service. See Notice, Department of State, Division of Consumer
Protection, Utility Intervention (Jan. 2, 2013) (on file with author).
144. See PUBLIC UTILITY LAW PROJECT, http://www.pulp.tc/. PULP advocates on
behalf of low income and rural consumers on issues of affordable energy and
telecommunications access. See id.
145. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED PERSONS, http://www.aarp.org/
?intcmp=GLBNAV-PL-HOME-HOME. AARP is a non-profit organization
dedicated to improving the quality of life for those 50 years of age and older. See id.
146. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Report of the Collaborative Regarding
Protections for Low Income Customers of Energy Services Companies, Case 12-M0476, et al., at 2 (Nov. 5, 2015).
147. Id. at 32.
148. Id. at. 33. (Low-income consumers interested in price consistency are better
served by enrolling in the utility’s budget billing program, which provides consumers
with a flat price each month without extracting a premium for offering a fixed
monthly price as the ESCOs charge.); see id. at 33-34. DPS Staff testified during the
evidentiary hearings regarding its analysis of the prices ESCOs charged for fixed
price products and found “a continuous 30% premium associated” with fixed rate
plans; see also In the Matter of Eligibility Criteria for Energy Service Companies et
al., Case 15-M-0127, at 2,502, Evidentiary Hearing (Dec. 6, 2017). Although one of
the ESCOs’ expert witnesses testified that during the polar vortex, some ESCO
customers saved 10% over utility customers in the coldest month, DPS Staff testified
that when considering a 30% premium on average over the course of three years (the
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While the low-income Collaborative was underway, the
Commission was simultaneously contemplating whether to enact
similar restrictions on ESCOs serving all mass market customers,
namely residential customers and small commercial customers. On
May 12, 2015, DPS Staff led a Technical Conference for all
stakeholders to discuss rules regarding the Commission’s regulation of
DER service providers and products insofar as those providers could
also be ESCOs.149 The goals of the conference included obtaining
input from all stakeholders “regarding the design, structure, and level
of supervision of DER providers that will be appropriate to ensure
consumer protections, while at the same time enabl[ing] markets to
develop through fair competition.”150 The Commission also sought to
obtain input from stakeholders regarding potential changes to the UBP
as they would apply to ESCOs serving all mass market customers.151
Specifically, the Commission endeavored to “increase the
participation and benefits of residential and small non-residential
customers and . . . reform the State’s energy industry to . . . promote
penetration of renewable energy resources and enhance customers’
ability to manage their energy usage and bills.”152
DPS Staff subsequently issued a proposal for public comment
arising from the Technical Conference.153 Following the comment
period on the Staff Proposal, the Commission issued an order on
February 23, 2016 (Reset Order) that revised the UBP by declaring
that ESCOs may only enroll mass market customers via contracts that
relevant period for which all data was available to compare ESCO prices to utility
prices from 2014-2016), “a 10% savings in one month does not compare equitably
to three years of 30% premium.”
149. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Notice of Technical Conference, Case
15-M-0180, et al., at 1 (Apr. 21, 2015).
150. Id. at 2.
151. Id. at 2-3.
152. Id. at 3.
153. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Comments of the Joint Utilities to the Staff
Proposal, Case 15-M-0127, et al., at 1 (July 28, 2015). DPS Staff was still seeking
comments on similar issues a year later. See N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Notice
Seeking Comments, Case 15-M-0127, et al., at 2 (May 10, 2016) (seeking public
comment on three DPS Staff whitepapers: performance bonds or other means of
demonstrating financial security for ESCOs, reference prices for ESCO products to
allow transparent comparisons of ESCO and utility prices, and express consent from
ESCO customers regarding contract renewals).
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either (1) guaranteed savings compared to what the mass market
customers would have paid as a full service utility customer, or (2)
provided the customers with at least 30% renewably-sourced
electricity.154 The Reset Order further tasked the Commission, in
collaboration with various stakeholder parties, to consider imposing
additional long-term conditions on ESCOs and their ability to serve
mass market customers, including whether ESCOs should be required
to post performance bonds.155
A suite of legal challenges ensued, including challenges to the
Commission’s jurisdiction to enact such a prohibition and procedural
due process challenges.156 The New York State Supreme Court in
Albany County held that the Commission had broad statutory authority
to regulate ESCOs’ pricing practices. On appeal, the State of New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Judicial Department
upheld this conclusion.157 However, the Appellate Division vacated

154. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Resetting Retail Energy Markets
and Establishing Further Process, Case 15-M-0127, et al., at 1-2 (Feb. 3, 2016).
155. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Resetting Retail Energy Markets
and Establishing Further Process, Case 15-M-0127, et al., at 20 (Feb. 23, 2016).
Performance bonds are required in other industries to demonstrate financial
capability. For example, contractors are often required to provide a surety bond that
cover the costs of any labor delegated to a subcontractor. Such surety bonds act as a
form of credit used to reimburse homeowners in the event that a claim arises out of
the work performed; see Romualdo P. Eclavea, Contractors’ Bonds Summary
February 2018 Update, 17 AM. JUR. 2d (Feb. 2018). Stakeholders in the retail access
collaborative were directed to consider the magnitude of any potential bonds and
how such bonds would be administered most efficiently. See also Reset Order, supra
note 134, at 2.
156. See Nat’l Energy Marketers Ass’n et al. v. N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n.,
2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 26233, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Albany County July 22, 2016); Retail
Energy Supply Ass’n et al. v. N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n., (Albany County Index
No. 870-16); Family Energy Inc. et al. v. N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n., (Albany
County Index No. 874-16), Decision/Order issued July 22, 2016 (Zwack, J); aff’d
Matter of National Energy Marketers Ass’n. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 2017 NY Slip
Op 05901 (July 27, 2017) and Matter of Retail Energy Supply Ass’n. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n., 2017 NY Slip Op 05908, at *7 (July 27, 2017).
157. See Matter of Retail Energy Supply Assn. v. Public Serv. Comm’n., 2017 NY
Slip Op 05908, at *7 (July 27, 2017) (“In fact, it is the [Public Service Commission]
PSC’s broad jurisdiction that enabled it to allow ESCOs access to utility systems in
the first place. The PSC essentially maintains that this same authority allows it to
impose limitations on ESCO rates as a condition to continued access. We agree.”).
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certain portions of the order on due process grounds and remitted the
matter to the Commission for further proceedings.158
Meanwhile, after considering the low-income Collaborative Report
and the extensive record developed over years of administrative
proceedings, the Commission issued an order in July 2016 enacting a
moratorium on ESCOs’ sale of energy to low-income consumers.159
The Commission concluded that such a moratorium was necessary to
protect low-income consumers, as ESCOs had demonstrated that they
were either unwilling or unable to offer products to low-income
consumers that resulted in cost savings compared to the rates charged
by utilities.160 Through the moratorium, the Commission also sought
to ensure that “the financial benefits provided to [low-income
consumers] through utility low-income assistance programs are not
absorbed by ESCOs, who in turn, provide gas and electricity at higher
prices without corresponding value.”161
As with the order enacting limitations on ESCOs service to mass
market customers, a series of legal challenges ensued following the
Commission’s moratorium on low-income service. After two ESCO
trade associations, Retail Energy Supply Association (RESA) and
National Energy Marketers Association (NEMA), petitioned for a
rehearing of the July 2016 Order, the Commission reaffirmed its
determination in a September 2016 Order. The September 2016 Order
found that a moratorium was necessary because the Collaborative
proceedings had made clear that ESCOs would not be able to provide
price guarantees or valuable energy products to low-income
consumers “anytime in the near future.”162 NEMA, BlueRock Energy,
Inc., Residents Energy, LLC and Verde Energy USA New York, LCC
(collectively NEMA) and RESA then filed lawsuits seeking a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and a permanent injunction of the
158. Nat’l Energy Marketers Ass’n et al. v. N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n., at *9;
aff’d in part, Matter of Nat’l Energy Marketers Ass’n. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 2017
NY Slip Op 05901 (July 27, 2017); Matter of Retail Energy Supply Ass’n. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n., 2017 NY Slip Op 05908, at * 8-9 (July 27, 2017).
159. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Regarding the Provision of Service
to Low-Income Customers by Energy Service Companies, Case 12-M-0476 et al., at
17-18 (July 15, 2016).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 10.
162. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order on Rehearing and Providing
Clarification, Case 12-M-0476 et al., at 14 (Sept. 19, 2016).
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Commission’s July 2016 and September 2016 Orders. On September
28, 2016, the Albany County Supreme Court granted the TRO,
preventing the implementation of the Commission’s July and
September Orders until further order from the Court.163
The next month, the Commission published a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in the State Register to advise the public that it was
considering modifying the July 2016 and September 2016 Orders.164
Following a full statutory notice and comment period, the Commission
issued an order in December 2016, reaffirming the necessity of the
protections provided in the July 2016 and September 2016 Orders.165
The December 2016 Order thus converted the moratorium in the July
2016 and September 2016 Orders into a permanent prohibition on
ESCO service to low-income consumers by prohibiting ESCOs from
enrolling new low-income consumers or renewing the contracts of
existing low-income consumers.166 The Commission explained that an
immediate prohibition on ESCO service to low-income consumers was
necessary to protect consumers from abusive conduct and to protect
the taxpayers and other ratepayers who fund the energy assistance
program subsidies to low-income consumers.167 However, the
December 2016 Order permitted ESCOs willing or able to guarantee
savings to low-income consumers to seek a waiver from the general
prohibition on providing service to mass market customers.168 Finally,
163. Nat’l. Energy Marketers Assn. v. N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 60 N.Y.S.
760, 764-65 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017).
164. See 38 N.Y. Reg. 16 (Oct. 5, 2016).
165. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Proceeding on Motion of the
Commission to Assess Certain Aspects of the Residential and Small Non-Residential
Retail Energy Markets in New York State, Case 12-M-0476 et al., at 3 (issued Dec.
16, 2016).
166. Id. at 19.
167. Id. at 9.
168. Id. at 23-34. The Commission explained that it would consider granting a
waiver if an ESCO could demonstrate (a) an ability to calculate what the customer
would have paid to the utility; (b) a willingness and ability to ensure that the customer
would pay no more than what would have been owed to the utility; and (c)
appropriate reporting and an ability to verify compliance with these requirements.
See id. To date, four ESCOs have successfully petitioned for a waiver of the
prohibition and is permitted to provide commodity service to participants in utility
low-income assistance programs. Id. at 4 (finding that M&R failed to provide
sufficient details regarding its price calculations and failed to report any
demonstrated guaranteed savings); see also id. (finding that Drift failed to provide
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the Commission noted that it would continue pursuing reforms for
mass market customers and acknowledged the possibility that
successfully resolving issues in the energy retail market could
eventually obviate the need for any prohibition on ESCO service in the
future.169
NEMA and RESA amended their petition to challenge the
December 2016 Order, in addition to the July and September 2016
Orders. The Albany County Supreme Court dismissed this petition on
June 30, 2017.170 The court first noted that it had previously
determined that the Commission had authority to regulate ESCOs.171
The court then held that the Commission’s findings regarding lowincome energy customers were rational and supported by the record.172
Notably, the court rejected as unsupported the ESCOs’ contention that
“there is value in the different products ESCOs offer . . . the gift cards
ESCOs offer a low-income rate payer are actually paid for by the
ratepayer through the [Home Energy Assistance Program] HEAP
assistance, and hardly meet an energy need.”173 The Court went on to
note that ESCOs’ fixed price plans did not constitute a unique, valueadded service because the utilities “always had to offer fixed rate
billing” through their budget programs.174
The Commission’s low-income prohibition was set for
implementation in fall 2017, but legal challenges still abound. 175 In
the requisite calculations to demonstrate how it would ensure a lower price than the
utilities and was unable to report on its proposed guaranteed savings plan offering);
id. at 5-6 (finding after a review of Ambit’s documents and calculations that it
adequately demonstrated it could provide 1% savings to customers through its
Guaranteed Savings Plan and that if no savings occur, Ambit would issue a refund
check to the customer).
169. See Order Adopting a Prohibition on Service to Low-income Customers by
Energy Service Companies, supra note 164, at 3.
170. Nat’l. Energy Marketers Assn., 60 N.Y.S. at 765.
171. Id. at 768.
172. Id. at 772-73 (reasoning the Commission’s findings were “well written,
exceptionally comprehensive, address all of petitioners’ arguments, and are well
supported by the record”).
173. Id. at 774.
174. Id.
175. The ESCOs have appealed Judge Zwack’s June 2017 order upholding the
Commission’s moratorium on ESCOs serving low-income customers granting leave
for appeal. Nat’l. Energy Marketers Assn. v. N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n., Motion
No. 2018-100, 2018 N.Y. LEXIS 495, at *1 (N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018) (granting leave to
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March 2018, the New York Court of Appeals granted the motions of
RESA and NEMA seeking leave to appeal from the Third
Department’s decision upholding the Commission’s jurisdiction to
regulate ESCOs.176 In the meantime, the Commission continues its
consideration of whether to enact a prohibition on ESCO service to
mass market customers and/or what other market reforms are needed
in this sector of the retail energy market. An evidentiary hearing on
this matter occurred before two administrative law judges in
November 2017 and December 2017, and post hearing briefs on the
issues were filed in April and May 2018.177
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGULATORY REFORM
As is clear from the history of these proceedings, the Commission
has been unable to correct the market abuses that persist after New
appeal). Meanwhile, a private plaintiff filed a putative class action lawsuit against
the Commission in the Federal District Court of the Norther District, alleging various
statutory and constitutional challenges to the Commission’s moratorium on ESCO
service for low-income customers. The Northern District Court denied the plaintiff’s
motion for a TRO staying the Commission’s Low-Income Moratorium and rejected
plaintiff’s request that the court deny her motion for a preliminary injunction so that
she could appeal. Plaintiff appealed to the Second Circuit anyway and requested a
TRO. Judge Cabranes entered a temporary stay of the Commission’s Order until a
full motions panel could hear and decide the motion. If the Second Circuit denies
plaintiff’s TRO request, the case will be remanded back to the district court where
the Commission’s motion to dismiss and plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary
injunction remain pending.
176. See Matter of Retail Energy Supply v. New York State Public Service
Commission, 152 A.D.3d 1133 (3d Dep’t July 27, 2017) appeal docketed, No. 201899 (Mar. 27, 2018); Matter of National Energy Marketers Assn. v New York State
Public Service Commission, 152 A.D.3d 1122 (3d Dep’t July 27, 2017) appeal
docketed, No. 2018-99 (Mar. 27, 2018). Briefs are due in May and July 2018, with
oral argument occurring in the fall of 2018.
177. See Case 15-M-0127, et al. See also State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Notice
Seeking Comments on Revisions to the Uniform Business Practice (Mar. 8, 2017)
(The Commission is also considering what revisions should be made to the UBP to
address current problems in the market to: (1) incorporate protections to prevent
early termination or cancelation fees in the event of energy account holders death
before the end of the contract term; (2) eliminate the appearance of an ESCO
representative’s full name on the identification badge worn by the marketer while
soliciting to potential customers; and (3) other related matters and housekeeping
items).
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York restructured its energy industry. Investigations into various
ESCOs and settlement agreements negotiated with the Attorney
General’s Office have not eradicated market abuses, and neither have
various revisions to the UBP. Thus, unless or until the current abuses
in the ESCO retail energy market are eliminated, ESCOs should be
prohibited from offering products to mass market consumers that do
not either guarantee savings or guarantee a value-added service in the
form of renewable energy generation and sourcing that is sufficient to
offset the premium paid to the ESCOs. The volume of customer
complaints is further demonstration of the retail energy market’s
failure. As such, a strong regulatory response targeted to remedying
the causes of such complaints is necessary.178 This targeted response
should consist of a prohibition on ESCOs serving all mass market
customers with procedures enacted for ESCOs to seek a waiver from
this prohibition if they can demonstrate: (1) guaranteed savings below
the default utility price or (2) additional value provided from
renewably sourced energy in excess of what the current renewable
utility mix already provides.179 In addition, reforms still must be made
to the UBP and should consist of amending the section pertaining to
contract renewals and material changes. Notably, any regulatory
measure is only as strong as its enforcement. Therefore, the
Commission should monitor the market for compliance and enforce
the UBP through the imposition of penalties and other fines where
necessary.
A. The Commission has Jurisdiction to Enact a Prohibition on
Mass Market Service
As a preliminary matter, the Commission possesses jurisdiction to
issue a prohibition or otherwise condition the ability of ESCOs to serve
mass market consumers. Article 1 of the Public Service Law grants the
Commission broad statutory authority to regulate ESCOs:

178. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Resetting Retail Energy Markets
and Establishing Further Process Case 12-M-0476, at 12 (Feb. 23, 2016) (finding an
increase in abuses in the ESCO market and customer complaints despite repeated
modifications to the UBP to strengthen consumer protections).
179. See DPS Staff Direct Panel Testimony, supra note 167, at 71 (discussing
current utility generation mixes comprised of almost 30% renewable sources).
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[t]he jurisdiction, supervision, powers and duties of the
public service commission shall extend . . . [t]o the
manufacture, conveying, transportation, sale or distribution
of . . . electricity for light, heat or power . . . to electric plants
and to the persons or corporations owning, leasing or
operating the same.180
The Commission’s regulatory authority encompasses ESCOs as
entities selling energy to New York consumers.181 To exercise this
authority, the legislature granted the Commission not only specifically
enumerated duties but “also all powers necessary or proper to enable
[the Commission] to carry out the purposes” of the Public Service
Law.182
Article 1, Section 5 further mandates that the Commission, “shall
encourage all persons and corporations subject to its jurisdiction to
formulate and carry out long-range programs, individually or
cooperatively, for the performance of their public service
responsibilities with economy, efficiency, and care for the public
safety, the preservation of environmental values and the conservation
of natural resources.”183 Section 5 is broad enough to encompass
Commission oversight of ESCOs as necessary to promote the values
of economy, efficiency, and public safety.184 Given that the REV
initiative has the goal of promoting clean energy through the
development and deployment of DERs,185 Article 1, Section 5 of the
Public Service Law requires Commission oversight of any new
markets and programs in which ESCOs choose to participate as DER
180. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 5(1)(b) (2018).
181. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Adopting ESCO Price Reporting

Requirements And Enforcement Mechanisms Case 06-M-0647, at 10 (Nov. 8, 2006)
(applying price-reporting requirements to ESCOs pursuant to article 1 authority); see
also State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Adopting Amendments to the Uniform
Business Practices, Granting in Part Petition on Behalf of Customers and Rejecting
National Fuel Gas Distribution Corporation’s Tariff Filing Case 98-M-1343, at 10
(Oct. 27, 2008) (explaining that the Commission has “well-understood jurisdiction
over ESCOs and their marketing practices” under Article 1).
182. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 4(1).
183. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 5(2) (emphasis added).
184. Shall, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
185. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Instituting Proceeding Case 14M-0101 (Apr. 25, 2014).
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suppliers186 to ensure the adequate “performance of their public service
responsibilities.”187
In addition, the Commission has authority under Article 4 of the
Public Service Law to regulate the terms and conditions by which
ESCOs are permitted to access public utility infrastructure to sell
energy to consumers.188 The Commission exercised these statutory
powers when it restructured the retail access energy market, requiring
that public utilities permit ESCOs to access the utilities’ distribution
systems.189 The Commission necessarily retained this same discretion
to alter the terms and conditions of ESCOs’ access to the distribution
system in the future.190 Articles 1 and 4 of the Public Service Law vest
the Commission with continuing supervision over the restructured
market created to ensure that competition provides consumers with
lower energy prices and valuable energy products.191
Article 2, Section 53 of the Public Service Law also provides
authority for the Commission’s jurisdiction, as ESCOs fall within the
definition of an entity that “sells or facilitates the sale or furnishing
of . . . electricity to residential customers.”192 Article 2 of the Public
Service Law contains the Home Energy Fair Practices (HEFPA)
provisions, which impose legislatively mandated rules relating to
energy service for residential consumers who could suffer great harm
if their service is terminated due to nonpayment of energy bills.193
186. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Adopting Regulatory Policy
Framework and Implementation Plan Case 14-M-0101 (issued Feb. 26, 2015)
(“Framework Order”).
187. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 5(2).
188. See N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law §§ 4(1), 5(1)(b), 66, 66-d.
189. See also Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Com., 119 A.D.2d 353,
354-56 (3d Dep’t 1986).
190. See Campo Corp. v. Feinberg, 279 A.D. 302, 305-07 (3d Dep’t 1952)
(reasoning that the Commission possessed authority under Article 4 to regulate
access to public-utility service and ban nonutility landlords from engaging in practice
of submetering); see also State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Statement of Policy on
Further Steps Toward Competition in Retail Energy Markets, Case 00-M-0504, at
18 (Aug. 25, 2004) (reiterating the Commission’s “regulatory involvement [should]
be tailored to reflect the competitiveness of the market”).
191. See Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Com., 71 N.Y.2d 313, 320-22
(1988); see also Energy Ass’n v. PSC, 169 Misc. 2d 924, 932-35 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1996).
192. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 53.
193. See PSL § 30

388

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXIX

When HEFPA was first passed and incorporated into the Public
Service Law in 1981, the Commission found that HEFPA did not apply
to ESCOs because utilities remained the provider of last resort for
consumers and ESCOs did not have authority to terminate consumers’
energy service.194 Subsequent to the Commission’s finding, the
legislature amended Article 2 in 2002 to both apply HEFPA’s
requirements to ESCOs and to afford ESCOs the ability to suspend
residential consumers’ energy service.195 However, this Article 2
amendment left unaltered the Commission’s jurisdiction over ESCOs
in Articles 1 and 4 of the Public Service Law. Thus, the Article 2
amendment merely created a floor of legislatively mandated consumer
protections that the Commission must maintain for all residential
consumers irrespective of whether those consumers obtain their energy
service from an ESCO or a regulated utility.196
A central tenet of statutory interpretation advises the reader not to
“be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to
the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.”197 Here,
the entirety of the Public Service Law guarantees that all members of
the public receive safe and reliable access to electricity. When the
Commission created new markets and programs to allow ESCOs
access to the grid to serve the retail market, it had authority to
“introduce competition into a monopolistic marketplace and thus
lower prices to consumers.”198
It is therefore axiomatic that the Commission similarly has authority
to regulate how ESCOs operate and ensure they serve the public
interest in these new markets and programs. Accordingly, enactment
of a prohibition on ESCOs serving mass market customers would be a
proper exercise of authority insofar as the prohibition would protect
consumers from the current predatory business practices ESCOs
employ and ensure that the retail market operates fairly. If the
194. See Op. 97-5, at 22-24; see also N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law Art. 2, §§30-52.
195. See Ch. 686, § 2, 2002 N.Y. Laws 3657, 3657-61; see also Mem. of State

Consumer Protection Board, reprinted in Bill Jacket for Ch. 686, at 9-10(2002)
[hereinafter CPB Mem.]; N.Y. Pub. Serv. L. Art. 2 § 30; 16 NYCRR § 11.1.
196. See CPB Mem., supra note 194, at 9-10.
197. United States v. Boisdoré’s Heirs, 49 U.S. 113, 122 (1850).
198. Energy Ass’n of New York State v. Public Serv. Comm’n of the State of New
York, 169 Misc. 2d 924 (Albany County Sup. Ct. 1996) (citing CNG Transmission
Corp. v. New York State Public Serv. Comm’n, 185 A.D.2d 671 (4th Dep’t. 1992)).
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Commission chose to prohibit ESCOs from serving mass market
customers, it would be carrying out its fundamental purpose of
ensuring that energy resources remain affordable to the public.199
B. A Prohibition on Mass Market Service is Appropriate
During discovery and the submission of testimony in the fall of 2017
and through the end of the evidentiary hearings concluding in
December 2017, various parties have proposed that the Commission
prohibit ESCOs from serving mass market customers if ESCOs cannot
offer consumers guaranteed savings. While many ESCOs seek to
perpetuate the status quo, others propose enacting various bans on
ESCO service, including the DPS Staff, UIU, the New York Attorney
General’s Office, and PULP.200 The ultimate issue in these
proceedings is how to regulate the retail access market so that
consumers receive lower energy prices, additional valuable energy
products, and renewable energy options. Even one of the ESCO’s own
experts conceded that some action is warranted and that the
Commission was correct when it noted that “[w]hile a well-designed
market could offer these consumer opportunities, it simply does not
exist today.” Of the many proposals contemplated in these
proceedings, the DPS Staff’s proposal has the most merit and should
be adopted by the Commission. Nevertheless, the proposal would
benefit from further refinements.

199. See Matter of Energy Ass’n, 169 Misc. 2d 924, 927-32 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1996).
200. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, DPS Staff Panel Direct Testimony, at
20-21 Case 15-M-0127 (Sept. 15, 2017); see also State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
UIU/NYAG Panel Direct Testimony Case 15-M-0127, at 22 (Sept. 15, 2017); State
of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Barbara Alexander Direct Testimony on behalf of
PULP Case 15-M-0127, at 72 (Sept. 15, 2017). Although not a party to these
proceedings, AARP responded to the questions the Commission sought to answer in
these proceedings, especially the question of whether ESCOs should be prohibited
in total or in part from serving mass market customers. In response to that question,
AARP answered that “ESCOs should not supply mass-market customers if it cannot
be shown that they are matching or beating the customer’s incumbent utility price.”
State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Responses of AARP to Commission Questions,
Case 15-M-0127, at 1-2 (Sept. 15, 2017).
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1. The DPS Staff’s Proposal: A Good Starting Place
The primary reason residential consumers elect to take commodity
service from an ESCO is the belief that they will save money on their
energy rates compared to what the default utility offers. A secondary
reason residential consumers choose to obtain commodity service from
an ESCO is if they are assured of receiving a green energy product.201
Mindful of these motivations, in September 2017 the DPS Staff
proposed that the Commission prohibit ESCOs from serving mass
market consumers unless ESCOs can provide customers with: (1)
guaranteed savings below the default service utility price, (2) 100%
renewably-sourced products, or (3) community choice aggregation
options.202 DPS Staff recommend that:
except for instances where an ESCO is willing and able to
provide a durable guaranteed savings when measured
against the default utility service, where an ESCO is willing
and able to provide a value-added electric commodity
renewable resource energy product where 100% of the
electricity provided each calendar year was generated from
renewable resources, or in the context of community choice
aggregation, the retail access market for mass market
customers should be shut down.203
DPS Staff recommend that the Commission prohibits ESCOs from
enrolling any new mass market customers and that current mass
market customers be transitioned back to default utility service as
201. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Evidentiary Hearing Case 15-M-0127,
at 2,206-08 (Dec. 5, 2017) (DPS Staff Policy Panel testifying on the topic of
consumer choice in the New York energy market).
202. See id. at 20-21. Staff noted that, based on data received thus far, the
community choice aggregation model provided a potential pathway for ESCOs to
serve mass market customers and lower prices that those set by the default utility by
“maximizing the economies of scale and benefits,” especially where the aggregator
could “fully evaluate competing ESCO supply offers.” Id. at 130. Staff noted that
community choice aggregation models were still in their infancy in New York and
that while such models held potential, they still required monitoring and supervision.
See id. at 128-30. A full discussion and analysis of community choice aggregation
models is outside the scope of this article.
203. Id. at 21.
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existing contracts with ESCOs expire.204 Thus, the DPS Staff’s
proposal essentially creates a prohibition on ESCOs serving mass
market customers with three limited exceptions to the general
prohibition. The second of these limited exceptions – the provision of
100% renewably sourced energy – was included in recognition of
Governor Cuomo’s “strategy to lead on climate change and grow New
York’s economy by building a cleaner, more resilient and affordable
energy system for all New Yorkers . . . by stimulating investment in
clean technologies like solar, wind, and energy efficiency.”205 DPS
Staff further recognized that the governor’s REV initiative was
working “to ensure that New York State reduces its statewide
greenhouse gas emissions forty percent by 2030 and achieves the
internationally-recognized target of reducing emissions eighty percent
by 2050.”206 Accordingly, DPS Staff fashioned a solution to the ESCO
market problem that still allows for New Yorkers to participate in the
REV initiative by “securing 100% renewable commodity contracts” if
ESCOs are willing and able to provide them. The DPS Staff noted that
such products “will likely come at a premium to the traditional
utilities’ rate offerings” and that perhaps ESCOs could compete in this
niche renewable market space to provide the lower prices and value
the Commission had originally envisioned when it first restructured
the state’s energy market.207 Under the DPS Staff’s proposal, any
ESCO offering such a product must guarantee that 100% of the energy
provided is derived from biomass, biogas, hydropower, solar, or
wind.208 As part of monitoring the 100% renewably-sourced exception
to the general prohibition on ESCOs serving the mass market, DPS
Staff also recommended that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id. at 70.
See id. at 71.
See id. Staff further explained that it set the renewable generation requirement
at 100% because some utility service territories already provide a generation mix
consisting of approximately 30% renewables and “that the bar for ESCO products
should be set higher.” Id. Staff also recommended that any prices the ESCOs charged
for 100% sourced renewable products be revisited in a Track II proceeding to ensure
that the premiums charged provided “reasonable value to the customers in relation
to the cost of supplying such products.” Id. at 74.
208. See DPS Staff Panel Direct Testimony, supra note 199, at 73. Such a
guarantee is also subject to the definitions and other provisions and delivery rules of
the Commission’s Environmental Disclosure Program.
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ESCO annually file and certify with the Commission that all mass
market enrollments and contracts adhere to the Commission’s
Environmental Disclosure Program regarding environmental attributes
of the energy generation and attendant delivery rules.209
2. Refining the DPS Staff’s Proposal: Additional Enhancements
Are Necessary
The September 2017 DPS Staff proposal is laudable for many
reasons. Weeks of evidentiary hearings on the proposal in November
and December 2017 revealed that the current system of regulation and
the existing UBP are not sufficient to protect mass market consumers
from continued abusive ESCO marketing behavior, and the ESCOs
have thus far appeared largely unwilling to amend their business
practices in the absence of an Attorney General’s investigation.
Multiple ESCOs testified during the hearings that they lack any kind
of customer service evaluation or monitoring system to ensure and
demonstrate compliance with the existing UBP.210 Multiple ESCOs
were also unable to testify during the hearings as to the kind of valueadded services they currently offer to consumers to justify the
commodity service price differences compared to the default utility.211

209. Id. at 74. Failure to certify or maintain specific records available for auditing
purposes would result in the disqualification of the ESCO’s eligibility to provide
“any services to any customers in New York State.” Id.
210. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Evidentiary Hearing, Case 15-M-0127,
at 136 (Nov. 29, 2017) (Great Eastern Energy’s expert Ronald Lukas testifying that
he could not explain in detail how the ESCO monitored compliance with the UBP
and he could not opine on what would be “too frequent” an occurrence of UBP
violations before the company would consider changing its business practices).
211. See id. at 195 (Direct Energy’s expert Michael Kagan testifying that he was
unable to provide with particularity any value-added products or green products
Direct Energy currently offered New York residential consumers to justify the
differences in commodity price between the ESCO and the utilities); see also id. at
550 (Direct Energy’s expert witness Dr. John R. Morris admitting, when asked
whether his analysis included any quantifiable data to support his assertion that
ESCO energy supply products are distinguishable from the utilities’ supply products,
that the “value is largely not quantifiable”); id. at 756 (NEMA’s expert witness Dr.
Jeff Makholm admitting that he could not identify any ESCOs in New York that are
providing energy commodities generated by renewable sources at a higher rate than
utilities).
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One ESCO president testified that he offers his customers a bundled,
package deal including boiler service, LED lightbulbs, and electricity
at a fixed price per kilowatt hour consumed. However, because the
bundled services are billed together, he admitted that “customers
wouldn’t have any way of knowing how much they were paying for
commodity service, versus the LED lightbulbs, versus the boiler
maintenance” service.212
The UIU/NYAG Expert Panel testified that after a review of all the
discovery generated in the case, they “did not see sufficient
quantitative evidence that would explain the observed price disparity
between ESCO and Utility products.”213 Despite the lack of evidence
demonstrating ESCOs were providing additional value to consumers
in their product offerings that justified higher prices than utility
products, one ESCO expert opined that “[t]here should not be price
regulation. There should not be a limit” and that ESCOs should “be
allowed to charge what the market will bear.”214 Given these realities,
the DPS Staff’s proposal balances the need for enhanced consumer
protections while recognizing that ESCOs may still have a role to play
in providing renewable energy as part of the REV initiative. However,
a few refinements and additional regulatory reforms would enhance
the consumer protections presented in the current proposal.
a. The Procedure for a Written Waiver Process Should be Explicitly
Articulated in the UBP
To the extent that the Commission adopts aspects of the DPS Staff’s
proposal and enacts a prohibition on ESCOs serving mass market
customers, the Commission should also explicitly articulate a written
waiver process ESCOs may follow if they believe they can meet the
above-stated criteria (i.e. price savings compared to the default utility
service, 100% renewably-sourced generation, or community choice
212. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Evidentiary Hearing, Case 15-M-0127, at
4,046 (Dec. 12, 2017) (IEC’s expert witness and president of Brown’s Energy
Services, LLC Michael Palmese testifying regarding his business model and pricing
plans).
213. See e.g. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Evidentiary Hearing, Case 15-M0127, at 1,938 (Dec. 4, 2017).
214. See e.g. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Evidentiary Hearing, Case 15-M0127, at 1,405 (Dec. 1, 2017) (cross-examination of RESA’s expert Mr. Frank
Lacey).
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aggregation). Such a waiver process should be clearly explained in a
revised version of the UBP. Delineating the steps to securing a waiver
would clarify the conditions under which such service may be allowed
to mass market consumers. To that end, the waiver process should
include, at a minimum, a requirement that ESCOs file their waiver
petitions and discovery requests or responses on the New York State
Department of Public Service’s Document and Management Master
(DMM) system.215 The waiver process should also include the
opportunity for public comment, the filing and submission of which
would be available on the DMM site. Finally, the Commission should
set forth in the UBP what its review and approval process will be for
deeming an ESCO eligible to serve mass market customers. Such a
review should be conducted annually to ensure any ESCO serving
mass market customers continues complying with all local, state, and
federal laws. In the event an ESCO violates any of the terms of the
UBP, the Commission should pursue appropriate enforcement
mechanisms, including revocation of the ESCO’s eligibility to serve
mass market customers.
b. The UBP Contract Renewal Provisions Should be Amended
In addition to amending the UBP to include a written waiver process
for ESCOs seeking to serve mass market customers, the UBP should
also be revised with respect to Section 5(B)(5)(d), the provision
pertaining to material changes and contract renewals. Presently, this
provision of the UBP provides that:
no material changes shall be made in the terms or duration
of any contract for the provision of energy by an ESCO
without the express consent of the customer obtained under
the methods authorized in the UBP. This shall not restrict an
ESCO from renewing a contract by clearly informing the
customer in writing, not less than thirty days nor more than
sixty days prior to the renewal date, of the renewal terms and
the customer’s option to reject the renewal terms. A
customer shall not be charged a termination fee as set forth
in Section 5.B.3.1.a herein, if the customer objects to such
215. See Why Become a Registered User of the Document and Matter
Management (DMM) System?, N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., www.dps.ny.gov.
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renewal within three business days of receipt of the first
billing statement under the agreement as renewed.
Regarding contract renewals, with the exception of a rate
change, or an initial sales agreement that specifies that the
agreement renews on a monthly basis with a variable rate
methodology which was specified in the initial sales
agreement, all changes will be considered material and will
require that the ESCO obtain the customer’s express consent
for renewal.216
DPS Staff did not recommend revising any of the above language in
the UBP in its September 2017 proposal.217 As currently written, this
language essentially allows ESCOs to re-enroll customers at the
expiration of a fixed rate plan to a higher priced month to month
variable plan without obtaining customers’ express consent to renew a
contractual relationship with the ESCO under different terms than the
original contract.218
Section 5(B)(5)(d) of the UBP states that “no material changes shall
be made in the terms or duration of any contract for the provision of
energy by an ESCO without the express consent of the customer . . .
with the exception of a rate change. . . .” The language is ambiguous
because it is unclear whether switching a customer from a fixed rate
contract to a variable rate contract at the time of renewal is a material
contract change that would require express customer consent, or
whether this switching constitutes a “rate change” that is exempt from
the express consent requirement. The term “rate change” is not defined
within the definitions section of the UBP.219 Thus, a definition of “rate
change” should be added to Section 1 of the UBP to expressly indicate
that switching a customer from a fixed price contract to a variable
216. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Uniform Business Practices, Case 98-M1343, at 27 (Feb. 2016).
217. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, UBP Redline, Case 15-M-0127 (Sept.
15, 2017).
218. PULP refers to this situation as a “negative option renewal process” and
explains that such a process impacts a significant number of customers who “do not
understand they their prices have changed or why the ESCO can make such a
change.” See Barbara Alexander Direct Testimony supra note 199, at 62.
219. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Uniform Business Practices, Case 98M-1343, at 1-5 (2015).

396

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXIX

priced contract at the time of renewal is not a rate change, but rather a
material change that requires a customer’s express consent.
Alternatively, the UBP could be revised to expressly indicate that
switching a customer from a fixed price contract to a variable price
contract at the time of renewal constitutes a “billing option.” Section 5
applies only to material changes to a contract and renewals but not
“changing billing options.”220 As such, were a switch from a fixed
price contract to a variable price contract to be considered a “billing
option” and not a “rate change,” the exception to obtaining express
customer consent would not be available.
Whichever revision is ultimately enacted, the Commission should
clarify whether it interprets the term “rate change” as encompassing
the situation described above – namely, an ESCO switching a customer
from a fixed rate contract to a variable rate contract at the time of
renewal. If such a switch is considered a “rate change,” then express
customer consent is not required under the current rules. However,
switching a customer from a fixed price plan to a variable price plan
arguably constitutes a material contract change (and not merely a rate
change) such that express customer consent should be required.
In addition to stating that rate changes are an exception to the general
rule that all material changes to a contract require express customer
consent, Section 5(B)(5)(d) of the UBP also provides that express
consent is not required for “an initial sales agreement that specifies that
the agreement renews on a monthly basis with a variable rate
methodology which was specified in the initial sales agreement.”
Parties to the ESCO retail access proceedings have presented evidence
that many ESCO contracts do not properly disclose the “variable rate
methodology” employed when setting residential or small commercial
rates and that consumers fail to understand these nuances in billing
rates.221 Accordingly, this exception to obtaining express customer
consent should also be eliminated from the UBP.

220. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Uniform Business Practices, Case 98M-1343, at Section 5(A) (2015) (stating “This Section does not establish practices
for obtaining other energy-related services or changing billing options.”).
221. See e.g., Barbara Alexander Direct Testimony, supra note 199, at 62
(explaining that, based on her analysis, “most of the ESCO contractual terms do not
properly disclose the ‘variable rate methodology,’ as required by the UBP, in a
manner that would allow any customer to either understand the basis for the resulting
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C. A Prohibition on Mass Market Marketing Would Likely Pass
Constitutional Muster
If the Commission decided not to adopt the DPS Staff September
2017 proposal in full and instead only prohibited ESCOs from
engaging in door-to-door marketing and telemarketing to residential
customers, such a ban would nonetheless assist in providing muchneeded additional consumer protections to the retail energy market
space. If the Commission proceeded to enact such a ban on marketing,
it is almost certain that the ESCOs would challenge the ban and seek
to strike it down as an unconstitutional restriction on free speech under
the First Amendment.222 However, it is doubtful whether any such
legal challenge would succeed. Where, as here, the record
demonstrates that lesser restrictions have not been sufficient to achieve
the asserted governmental interest advanced by the restriction on
commercial speech, there is a colorable argument that a total ban in the
form of a prohibition on door-to-door and telephonic marketing is
necessary.
During the November and December 2017 evidentiary hearings, an
ESCO named Infinite Energy claimed that any ban on ESCO door-todoor and/or telephonic marketing service to residential customers
would violate the First Amendment.223 Infinite Energy relied on
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service
Commission of New York224 to support its constitutional argument.
However, Central Hudson is distinguishable from the instant case. In
Central Hudson, the issue was whether the Commission could impose
a regulation banning an electric utility from advertising to promote the
use of electricity.225 In December 1973, the Commission ordered New
York utilities to cease all advertising that promoted the use of
electricity when it became apparent that the state had insufficient fuel
stocks to continue meeting consumer demand throughout the 19731974 winter.226 When the fuel shortage eased three years later, the
rate or determine whether the resulting rate conformed to the stated methodology in
the terms and conditions”).
222. See Infinite Energy, Inc. d/b/a Intelligent Energy Ex., DC-1 (Oct. 27, 2017).
223. See id.
224. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
225. Id.
226. See id. at 558-59.
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Commission sought public comment on whether the ban on utility
promotional advertising should continue.227 Central Hudson opposed
the ban, claiming it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.228
The trial court and intermediate appellate court upheld the
Commission’s order, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed,
concluding that the governmental interest in the advertising ban
outweighed the constitutional value of the commercial speech.229
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed.230 The Court
noted that the Constitution affords less protection to commercial
speech than other forms of expression and that such protection “turns
on the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests
served by its regulation.”231 The Court began its analysis by noting that
the government was permitted to ban forms of communication that
were “more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.”232 Where
the communication is not misleading, the government must assert a
substantial interest that would be achieved by restricting the
commercial speech. Whether the restriction serves a substantial
interest turns on two criteria: (1) whether the restriction directly
advances the governmental interest involved, and (2) whether the
governmental interest could be served by lesser restrictions on the
commercial speech.233 Restraints that only indirectly advance the
governmental interest involved or that are not narrowly drawn are
impermissible.234 Accordingly, Central Hudson established a four-part
analysis when commercial speech is at issue:
1. Whether the speech concerns lawful activity and is not
misleading (thus demanding First Amendment protections);
2. Whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial;
3. Whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted;

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

See id. at 559.
See id.
See id. at 560-61.
See id. at 561.
Id. at 563.
Id.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 565-60.
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4. Whether the restriction is not more extensive than
necessary to serve that interest.235
In Central Hudson the Court found that advertisements by utilities
and unregulated firms are protected commercial speech, absent
extraordinary conditions, thus satisfying the first prong.236 The Court
further found that the second prong was met because the State’s
expressed interest in maintaining fair and efficient rates was a clear
and substantial governmental interest.237 While the Court deemed the
link between the advertising prohibition and the utility’s rate structure
tenuous “at most,” it determined that a direct link existed between the
state’s interest in fuel conservation and the Commission’s order,
thereby satisfying the third prong.238 Central Hudson, therefore, turned
on the fourth prong of the analysis. The Court ruled that “no showing
has been made that a more limited restriction on the content of
promotional advertising would not serve adequately the State’s
interests.”239 As such, the State’s regulation could not be upheld.
In the current proceedings, if the Commission ultimately chooses to
accept the DPS Staff’s proposal to prohibit ESCOs from engaging in
door-to-door sales and telemarketing to residential customers, a legal
challenge to the Commission’s adoption of the proposal would likely
focus on whether restrictions on advertising are permissible under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. Using the four-part analysis set
forth in Central Hudson, such a ban is likely to withstand
constitutional scrutiny.
First, given the record in the recent proceedings, a court may
conclude that the ESCOs fail to satisfy the first prong of the Central
Hudson analysis insofar as the ESCOs’ marketing practices are
deceptive and misleading, thereby warranting no constitutional
protection under the First Amendment. If a court agrees with that
premise, the analysis would end, and the ban would be upheld. If a
court disagreed and found that ESCOs’ marketing was constitutionally
protected speech, the court would then likely conclude that the asserted
governmental interest – providing affordable energy prices for
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 567.
See id. at 567-68
Id. at 569.
Id.
Id. at 570.
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consumers – is substantial pursuant to the reasoning stated in Central
Hudson. Under the third prong, regulation in the form of a ban on doorto-door and/or telephonic marketing directly advances the
governmental interest asserted because ESCO marketing leads
consumers to pay significantly higher rates for commodity service than
the default utility service charges. Fourth and finally, there is a valid
argument that a total ban on such marketing practices is required to
serve the asserted governmental interest insofar as decades of Attorney
General investigations, multiple UBP revisions, and numerous
stakeholder collaboratives and technical conferences have not
remedied the problems. During the November and December 2017
hearing, the New York Attorney General’s expert witness testified that
her investigations over the last seventeen years were indicative of a
broken industry, “because the complaints that we receive . . . they’re a
similar type. They’re slamming[,] they’re promises of substantial
savings, they’re failure to provide contracts, they’re high-pressure
sales. And these are patterns of practices that we see.”240 Moreover,
years of enforcement actions have not fully resolved issues in the
market and the New York Attorney General cannot “bring
enforcement actions against every entity that engages in these
practices. The fact is that we have . . . multiple ongoing investigations
into ESCO companies right now concerning the same type of
practices.”241 Accordingly, on these facts, a court would likely find that
a restriction on ESCOs’ marketing to residential customers would not
violate the First Amendment.

240. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Evidentiary Hearing, Case 15-M-0127, at
1,622 (Dec. 4, 2017) (testimony of Jane Azia, Chief of the Consumer Fraud’s Bureau
at the New York Attorney General’s Office).
241. Id. at 1,623. It is also important to note that the NYAG has found wide-spread
non-compliance even after settling enforcement actions with ESCOs. In one case,
the NYAG “found 70% non-compliance with the verification procedures.” Id. at
1826; see also id. at 1921 (explaining that when the NYAG was conducting
compliance reviews, including quality assurance logs that were provided after the
settlement, to ensure the ESCOs were complying with the “provision verifying that
all sales representatives who engaged in door-to-door solicitations comply with
laws . . . the compliance information that was produced indicated that there was
only . . . 30% were compliant with the AOD [Assurance of Discontinuance]”).
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D. A Prohibition on Mass Market Service Will Not Regulate ESCOs
out of the REV Arena
Possible constitutional challenges aside, another common argument
against implementing a prohibition on ESCOs serving mass market
customers is that ESCOs are required to fulfill the potential of REV
and increased regulations will prevent ESCOs from innovating in the
renewable energy space. Trade associations representing the interests
of ESCOs in policy proceedings have claimed that the instant
proceedings are not consistent with REV and that prohibiting ESCOs
from serving mass market customers “would undermine the role
imagined for ESCOs in the REV proceeding and thereby upend the
REV proceeding as a whole.”242 In response to suggestions of enacting
a prohibition on ESCOs serving the mass market, ESCO
representatives argue that
regulating ESCOs out of . . . New York’s mass-market
would eliminate an entire group of intermediaries and extend
monopoly energy services back to the transmission grid (in
the case of electricity) – which should not be seen as
anything other than a retrograde movement back from
energy delivery innovation targeting climate change in the
United States.243
Such claims are interesting insofar as the challenges in the ESCO
market have long pre-dated REV and its related policy proceedings.
As a preliminary matter, such arguments appear as a retroactive pretext
to justify the continued operation of ESCOs in the mass market. The
Attorney General’s Office has been investigating ESCOs’ marketing
and business practices for over two decades, and the instant
proceedings were commenced in 2012, two years before REV even
existed.244 Thus, for ESCOs to now claim that REV identified

242. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Direct Testimony of Jeff Makholm on
behalf of RESA, Case 15-M-0127, at 63 (Sept.15, 2017).
243. Id. at 60.
244. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Proceeding on Motion of the
Commission in Regard to Reforming the Energy Vision, Case 14-M-0101 (Apr. 25,
2014).
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numerous environmental goals “that can only be achieved efficiently
by” them appears disingenuous at best.245 At worst, it is inaccurate.
Admittedly, the need to regulate must be balanced against the need
to innovate. The energy sector is New York’s largest source of GHGs,
responsible for 86% of emissions.246 It is clear that cleaner, renewable
sources of generation are necessary if New York wants to maintain its
position as a leader in innovating climate change mitigation strategies.
However, providing additional consumer protections will not regulate
ESCOs out of the REV arena. Enacting a prohibition on ESCOs’
service to mass market customers except in instances where the
ESCOs certify that 100% of the electricity they provide is sourced
from renewable generation preserves ESCOs’ ability to participate in
REV if they so choose. If the Commission adopts the DPS Staff’s
proposal, not only would ESCOs be free to provide value-added
services in the form of renewably-sourced products that assist New
York in meeting its environmental goals, they would be required to do
so in the absence of guaranteeing lower prices than utility service.
Contrary to claims that increased regulation would frustrate the
goals of REV, the DPS Staff proposal would force ESCOs to facilitate
New York’s climate change mitigation goals present in REV.247 REV
245. See Direct Testimony of Jeff Makholm on behalf of RESA, supra note 241,
at 64.
246. See N.Y. STATE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, N.Y. STATE
GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTOR: 1990-2014 FINAL REPORT (2017).
247. Article 6 of New York’s Energy Law had required the New York State
Energy Planning Board agencies (the Commission, NYSERDA, Department of
Transportation, Department of Economic Development, and DEC) to review and
update as necessary a state energy master plan every two years. See N.Y. Energy
Law § 6-106 (2016); see also COMMITTEE ON ENERGY, supra note 82. Components
of the State Energy Plan consisted of forecasting requirements, summaries of the
state’s suppliers for meeting forecasted requirements, analysis of emerging energy
trends, and recommendations for appropriate administrative and legislative action.
On January 1, 2003, the law expired and New York lacked a comprehensive state
energy planning process until 2014 when Governor Andrew Cuomo created the
Reforming the Energy Vision policy. The REV led to the creation of the Draft 2014
N.Y. State Energy Plan (Draft 2014 SEP), which garnered tens of thousands of public
comments and resulted in the N.Y. State Energy Planning Board’s creation of the
2015 N.Y. State Energy Plan. ENERGY TO LEAD, supra note 14, at 11. The 2015 Plan
was touted as “a comprehensive roadmap to build a clean, resilient, and affordable
energy system for all New Yorkers.” The Plan consists of two volumes: the first
contains a series of policy recommendations and analysis and the second discusses
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is expected to “build an integrated energy network able to harness the
combined benefits of the central grid with clean, locally generated
power.”248 As such, REV is intended to transform how New York
utilities operate by allowing them to (1) earn return in energy
efficiency and distributed energy resource markets, (2) use price
signals to encourage system efficiency, and (3) take advantage of
technological advancements and innovation.249 REV envisions a
market whereby private sector investment assists with transitioning the
state to clean energy, rather than government and ratepayers bearing
the brunt of the costs.250
The Commission has acknowledged that that the, “[d]evelopments
of markets in which vendors offer innovative services of value to
consumers, and in which consumers can participate with confidence,
is critically important to the success of the Reforming the Energy
Vision (REV) initiative.”251 However, the Commission realizes it is
equally true that “[r]etail energy markets focused on commodity-only
products, and in which ESCOs do not meet expectations of many
customers, will thwart these objectives.”252 If ESCOs are unable or
energy use, supply and demand forecasts, inventory of state greenhouse gas
emissions, and the environmental and public health costs associated with energy
production. See ENERGY TO LEAD, supra note 14; see also N.Y. STATE GREENHOUSE
GAS INVENTORY AND FORECAST: INVENTORY 1990-2011 AND FORECAST 2012-2030,
NYSERDA (2015). A detailed analysis of the REV proceedings is outside the scope
of this article, as such proceedings were complex, spanned several years, and
involved comments and collaborative working groups of nearly 300 parties. See State
of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in Regard to
Reforming the Energy Vision, Order Adopting Regulatory Policy Framework and
Implementation Plan, Case 14-M-0101, at 5 (Feb. 26, 2015).
248. ENERGY TO LEAD, supra note 14, at 7.
249. See ENERGY TO LEAD, supra note 14, at 38-40. REV also recognizes that lowto moderate-income (LMI) consumers spend disproportionate shares of their income
on their energy bills, while also being less likely to have access to clean sources of
energy. The REV plan will strive to deploy more distributed energy resources in LMI
communities to bring energy costs down for these consumers while seeking to lessen
the impact of air pollution caused from the siting of many fossil fuel generation and
transportation facilities in those communities. One quarter of New York’s population
qualify as LMI.
250. See ENERGY TO LEAD, supra note 14, at 52.
251. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Resetting Retail Energy Markets
and Establishing Further Process, Case 15-M-0127, at 3 (Feb. 23, 2016).
252. Id.
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unwilling to offer products beyond the commodity-only offerings of
utilities and cannot increase the percentage of renewable energy in the
generation mix, then they are not currently achieving the goals of REV.
The DPS Staff’s proposal regarding the 100% renewable energy
option for serving mass market customers would ensure that ESCOs
are actually working to achieve REV goals.253 One party in particular
expressed its desire for a requirement that ESCOs be required to offer
100% renewable energy because, although ESCOs may currently offer
some green products, “it’s important . . . that the information about
where those RECs [Renewable Energy Credits] are coming from is
transparent and what percentage of that power is, in fact, green
power.”254 Another expert witness expressed concern that based on her
review of terms and conditions and actual renewable energy products
being marketed to New York consumers, “too many of these offers
reflect ESCO purchases of Renewable Energy Credits or RECs from
jurisdictions outside New York and, as a result, will not provide any
incremental renewable energy resources in the New York wholesale
market.”255
Experts believe that “[t]he changing climate should be seen as a
series of discrete, manageable problems that can be attacked from all
angles simultaneously. . . . Each part of the problem of climate change
has a solution that can make our society healthier and stronger.”256
253. The evidence to date suggests that under the current regulatory framework,
the majority of ESCOs are not incrementally increasing the penetration of
renewables in the State of New York. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
Evidentiary Hearing Case, 15-M-0127, at 4,174 (Dec. 12, 2017). The DPS Staff
Economics Panel testified that “a comparison of emissions profiles reveals
information on the mix of valued renewable energy in each ESCO’s supply portfolio.
Our direct testimony notes the similarity of emissions profiles between ESCOs,
suggesting little difference in the renewable mix provided by ESCOs. Given the
similarity of those profiles, it is unreasonable to assume that, on average, ESCOs
provided added value in terms of green energy.” See id.
254. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Evidentiary Hearing, Case 15-M-0127,
at 1,502-03 (Dec. 1, 2017) (testimony of the City of New York’s expert witness
panel). The Panel further opined that the percentage of green power it would like to
see in order to help aid the City’s goals as outlined in One NYC is 100% and
therefore consistent with DPS Staff’s proposal).
255. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Evidentiary Hearing, Case 15-M-0127, at
3,519 (Dec. 11, 2017) (PULP’s expert witness Barbara Alexander testifying on
current ESCO green product offerings).
256. BLOOMBERG & POPE, supra note 32, at 159.
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ESCOs certainly could be part of that solution, but only if they are
required to offer quantifiable value-added products, such as renewable
generation in excess of the current utility mix. To that end, adopting
the DPS Staff’s proposal that requires ESCOs to serve mass market
customers with either a savings guarantee below the utility price or a
100% renewable energy product advances the goals of REV.
Importantly, as DPS Staff members testified during the evidentiary
hearings, “[t]here are ESCOs and utilities that provide 100%. It’s
imminently doable.”257
Nevertheless, the Commission might wish to consider permitting
other tiers of renewable energy products into the mass market place as
a means of introducing more price transparency for consumers. For
example, it is conceivable that consumers might be interested in a 50%
renewable product, a 75% renewable product, and a 100% renewable
product. It is likely that such products can only be produced at a
premium above the default utility rates, and one would expect that as
the percentage of renewable generation increases in the product, so too
would the price of the product. If the Commission allowed ESCOs to
compete for mass market customers based on advertising and
certifying tiers of renewable energy products (and publishing the price
differences for varying renewable products), then consumers could
make more informed choices about whether to pay more money for
renewables or to remain with the default utility service. Therefore,
ESCOs’ experts’ claims that ending mass market service would end
the renewable energy industry in New York are unfounded under
either a 100% renewable only requirement scenario or a tiered
system.258
Not only will additional oversight not regulate ESCOs out of the
REV arena, but such enhanced consumer protections are vital to
developing another energy market imagined in REV: DERs.
Correcting abuses in the ESCO market is necessary to creating a
thriving DER market. Throughout the evidentiary hearing, multiple
ESCOs expressed their desire to expand by offering mass market

257. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Evidentiary Hearing, Case 15-M-0127, at
2,572 (Dec. 6, 2017).
258. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, John Hanger Rebuttal Testimony, Case
15-M-0127, at 3 (Oct. 27, 2017).
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customers not only commodity services but also DER services.259 For
example, Alan Tilley, Co-founder and Director of Power Operations
at Drift Marketplace, Inc., which intends to operate as both an ESCO
and a DER, opined during the hearing that “if the outcome of this
proceeding results in a shutdown of the current mass retail market, the
development of the new DER marketplace will be severely
compromised.”260 ESCO expert economist Dr. Jeff Makholm similarly
expressed the belief that “removing ESCOS from the electric and gas
markets would significantly impair ESCOS’ ability to provide DER
service for customers.”261 Possible DER products include a
Community Distributed Generation (CDG) subscription, energy
efficiency programs, battery storage, and on-site solar photovoltaic
(PV) systems. One can easily imagine a scenario in which an ESCO
seeks to provide commodity electricity service to a residential
customer and also provides DER service through installation of solar
panels and perhaps a battery storage unit. DPS Staff experts even
admitted during the evidentiary hearings that they were “expecting that
the ESCOs will play a significant role, especially to the extent that they
become DER providers in the REV marketplace.”262
Given the deception and fraudulent marketing claims that have
occurred in the ESCO arena, it is necessary that such abuses be
corrected so that they do not negatively impact the renewable DER
space. Consumer protection measures are all the more necessary in the
DER space where contracts for solar panels can last 20 years, far
longer than an electric commodity contract that typically spans a few
months to a year.
Recognizing the need for safeguards and adequate consumer
protection measures in this new space – especially since most mass
market customers do not have extensive energy bill management
experience – the Commission sought comments from stakeholders on
259. See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Evidentiary Hearing, Case 15-M-0127,
at 4,069-76 (Dec. 12, 2017) (discussing the testimony of the Impacted ESCO
Coalition panelists’ desires and intentions of expanding their businesses to provide
DER service in addition to ESCO commodity service).
260. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Initial Testimony of Alan Tilley, Case 15M-0127, at II-4, 18-21 (Sept. 15, 2017).
261. See Direct Testimony of Jeff Makholm on behalf of RESA, supra note 241,
at 71.
262. See Evidentiary Hearing, supra note 256, at 2,599.
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its proposed Uniform Business Practices for Distributed Energy
Resource Suppliers (UBP-DERS) in April 2017.263 Specifically, the
Commission sought comments on (1) the DPS Staff’s Supplemental
Whitepaper addressing the Commission’s oversight of distributed
energy resource suppliers (DERS);264 (2) the draft UBP-DERS;265 (3)
a set of rules governing, among other things, DER suppliers’ business
and marketing practices; and (4) the initial DER Oversight Staff
Proposal.266
Since the DER market is in its infancy and many customers may not
be familiar with the technologies, it is especially important that the
Commission implement regulatory safeguards that protect customers
from possible deception and establish the consumer confidence
necessary for the market to thrive. Concerns regarding deception and
misinformation spilling over from the ESCO space to the DER space
are not unfounded. At the June 19, 2017 Technical Conference, a
representative from NYSERDA, when discussing the NY-Sun
program,267 noted that Lead Generators – third-parties who market
DER products to customers and then sell the list of interested
customers to a particular DER supplier such as a solar company – have
already been the source of some customer complaints.268
Getting REV right means correcting market failures in the ESCO
world and preventing abuses in the DER market. The Commission is
taking steps towards achieving these important public policy goals
with the recent issuance of its Order Establishing Oversight
Framework and Uniform Business for Distributed Energy Resource

263. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Notice Seeking Comments on Proposed
Standards, Case 15-M-0180 (Apr. 12, 2017).
264. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Supplemental Staff Whitepaper on DER
Oversight, Case 15-M-0180 (Apr. 11, 2017).
265. Supplemental Staff Whitepaper on DER Oversight, supra note 263, at
Appendix A.
266. Supplemental Staff Whitepaper on DER Oversight, supra note 263, at
Appendix B.
267. See NY-Sun, N.Y. STATE ENERGY RESEARCH & DEV. AUTHORITY (2017),
https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/All-Programs/Programs/NY-Sun.
268. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, NY-Sun Customer Protections and
Concerns, Case 15-E-0180 (Apr. 11, 2017).
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Suppliers in October 2017.269 While the UBP-DERS is an important
first step in trying to protect the nascent DER market from some of the
abuses occurring in the ESCO market, it is unclear at this time how the
UBP and the UBP-DERS will apply to a single company that intends
to act both as an ESCO and as a DER if a prohibition on ESCO service
to mass market customers is put in place. For example, if the
Commission adopts the DPS Staff’s proposal as written, it is unclear
whether an ESCO providing a bundled 100% renewable commodity
product with DER service such as solar panels could engage in doorto-door marketing. It is also unclear which provisions would govern
customer consent and contract renewals of such bundled services.
Several commenters urged consolidation of the UBP for ESCOs and
the UBP-DERS, but the Commission noted that “the complexity of the
ongoing ESCO proceeding makes modifications to the UBP
impractical.”270 Nevertheless, the Commission agreed with
commenters “that a single document should ultimately be created to
avoid confusion or unnecessary duplication”271 and directed DPS Staff
to begin issuing a plan for combining the documents as soon as
practicable.272 Regardless of the recommendations that the
administrative law judges make to the Commission regarding the
ESCO evidentiary hearing following the submission of parties’ posthearing briefs, the Commission must be mindful of the ambiguities that
currently exist in the two sets of UBPs. Indeed, it would be prudent for
the Commission to consider consolidating the UBP for ESCOs and the
UBP-DERS immediately if it intends to allow ESCOs to continue
serving mass market customers in any fashion.
The importance of the ongoing ESCO proceedings cannot be
understated. The evidentiary hearings in late 2017 elicited much
testimony on the significance of encouraging innovation to facilitate
REV and climate change mitigation efforts in the energy sector around
the world. One expert opined, “[a]s energy distributors – particularly
electric companies – face a new wave of interest in new sources of
green and decentralized power production, New York has become a
269. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Establishing Oversight and
Framework and Uniform Business Practices for Distributed Energy Resource
Suppliers, Case 15-M-0180 (Oct. 19, 2017).
270. Id. at 22.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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magnet for international study in new energy markets as delegations
from around the world come to meet the REV staff and study the
initiative.”273 If REV is to be successful, it requires greater regulatory
oversight of ESCOs and DER service providers, not less.
E. A Note About Far-Reaching Impacts
It should also be noted that correcting abuses in the ESCO market,
preventing abuses in the DER market, and getting REV right would
allow New York to not only achieve emission reductions in the energy
sector, but also in the second largest sector that contributes to climate
change: agriculture.274 It is no secret that energy generation and
transmission can result in the permanent loss of agricultural lands.275
New York State lost 600,000 acres of agricultural lands between 2001
and 2010.276 Energy is necessary for agricultural operations and
irrigation, as well as food preservation and transportation.277
Moreover, methane emissions are the second largest source of New
York’s GHG emissions (fuel combustion emissions being the
largest).278 The primary sources of methane emissions are landfills,
agricultural animals, and natural gas leaks from the pipes in New
York’s transmission and distribution system.279 REV directs
NYSERDA to “work with private partners, regulators, and
stakeholders representing the agricultural, food processing, and source
separated food-waste management sectors to develop and spur market
adoption of innovative and replicable solutions, including anaerobic
digester biogas production and use, to deliver operational and energy
productivity gains, and additional revenue streams.”280 In addition,
REV requires the Department of Agriculture and Markets,
NYSERDA, and Department of Environmental Conservation to
273. See Direct Testimony of Jeff Makholm on behalf of RESA, supra note 241,
at 73.
274. Electricity and heat production is the largest contributing sector to climate
change. See Global Emissions by Economic Sector, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY
(2017), https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data.
275. ENERGY TO LEAD, supra note 14, at 61.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 63.
278. Id. at 13.
279. Id.
280. See ENERGY TO LEAD, supra note 14, at 76.
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“develop a comprehensive, cost-effective strategy to support in-state,
sustainable, low-carbon fuel production using agricultural and organic
waste feedstock, especially as a substitute for petroleum fuels imported
from out-of-state.”281
Harnessing the power of DERs could have significant impacts on
the agricultural sector because anaerobic digesters are one type of DER
being developed in the market place. Anaerobic digesters on farms,
coupled with biogas electric generators can “market locally-sourced
clean energy, contribute consistent, base load power to the grid, reduce
loads on transmission and distribution equipment, and provide wasted
heat for onsite and offsite use. In particular, excess power generated
by farms could benefit the grid by serving local electric loads in the
areas around these farms.”282 Anaerobic digestion on farms can not
only reduce GHG emissions associated with manure from livestock,
but it can also reduce GHG emissions attributable to food waste in
landfills because these facilities can use manure blended with food
waste.283 Farmers’ utility bills can be reduced by using anaerobic
digestion, which can also provide an alternative income stream if
farmers sell excess energy back to the grid.284 However, if ESCO
market abuses continue uncorrected and spill into the DER market, the
likelihood of anaerobic digesters appearing on farms or in
communities in numbers large enough to make an impact on GHG
emissions is slim.285
281. See id. at 77.
282. ENERGY TO LEAD, supra note 14, at 38.
283. Id.; see also NORMAN SCOTT ET AL., USING FOOD WASTES IN FARM-BASED

ANAEROBIC DIGESTERS (CORNELL MANURE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 2005).
284. ENERGY TO LEAD, supra note 14, at 39.
285. Admittedly, correcting abuses in the retail access energy market will not
remove all existing barriers standing in the way of a thriving DER market. As one of
the many REV working groups has admitted, another challenge to growing the DER
market is “the lack of standardization of metering, verification and reporting
requirements.” See State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Reforming the Energy Vision
(REV) Working Group 1: DSPP Markets, Final Report & Attachments, Case 14-M0101, at 8 (July 8, 2014). Additional technical challenges involve the need to monitor
and regulate DER installations. See id. at 9. Other challenges exist on an economic
level, such as the ability of DER providers to finance the costs of such projects or
the need to incent utilities to accept DERs as an alternative to investing in
transmission and distribution upgrades. Such challenges are being addressed in
related proceedings, such as Case 15-E-0751 Value of Distributed Energy Resource
(VDER) proceedings and related working groups.
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CONCLUSION
In the 1990s, New York embarked on an experiment of epic
proportions when it sought to restructure an industry that had
previously been a regulated monopoly: the energy industry. Like many
other states, New York sought to increase competition within the
energy sector to drive down prices for consumers and expand the range
of renewable energy options that were available. After waiting nearly
three decades, New York appears poised to finally assess the efficacy
of this great experiment. Years of escalating consumer complaints,
Attorney General investigations, and analysis by the DPS Staff have
revealed that residential consumers are not faring as well as the State
had hoped. Since 2014, New Yorkers electing to receive energy
commodity service from companies competing with the default
utilities were overcharged to the tune of one billion dollars. In
households where families struggle to make ends meet and often must
choose between putting dinner on the table or keeping the heat on, any
overcharge on an energy bill creates a public health hazard. More
families than ever before must continue confronting the Hobson’s
choice of paying the food bill or paying the energy bill when both costs
have never been higher.286
The status quo is not sustainable. The Commission stands poised at
a crossroads. It can continue allowing ESCOs to serve mass market
customers and rely on the Attorney General to investigate and enforce
the law. However, the last two decades have shown that enforcement
efforts alone are insufficient to yield the desired results. Alternatively,
the Commission can prohibit ESCOs from serving mass market
customers until ESCOs can deliver on the promises for which they
were allowed to enter the market in the first place: lower prices,
valuable energy products designed to lower consumers’ bills, and
innovative services like DERs and renewable green products. The
Commission’s primary purpose must be to protect ratepayers from

286. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Evidentiary Hearing, Case 15-M-0127, at
3,855 (Dec. 12, 2017) (according to PULP’s CPA expert witness William D. Yates,
“[d]uring the worst winter on record in New York State, ESCOs contributed
$149,431,097 of net extra cost to the affordability problems facing residential utility
customers”).
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potential market harms.287 Adoption of the DPS Staff proposal – with
the additional modifications discussed above – establishes a
comprehensive regulatory scheme that both protects consumers and
promotes fair competition in the ESCO market and the emerging DER
market.
Adoption of the DPS Staff proposal will implement proper
consumer protections while fulfilling the promise of REV and
ensuring New York is successful in its climate change leadership
efforts. The ESCO market is a cautionary tale. If similar abuses also
proliferate in the nascent DER market, it will be difficult to inspire the
consumer confidence necessary for that market to thrive or for other
renewable energy efforts to succeed. Regulatory intervention is
appropriate where, as here, the industry to be regulated “is of such
significance to every aspect of the economy and to life itself that the
State does not have the luxury of leisurely waiting for the market to
correct itself.”288 The spotlight is on and the evidence is in: New York
consumers deserve better. The Commission’s time to act is now.

287. State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Evidentiary Hearing, Case 15-M-0127, at
3,005 (Dec. 7, 2017) (DPS Staff Policy Panel testifying that the Commission’s
“overarching concern” is “rate payers receiving . . . safe and adequate service at a
just-and-reasonable rate”). See also id. at 3041 (testifying that the “priority is the
protection of the customer”).
288. ENERGY TO LEAD, supra note 14, at 11.

